THE NEW REPUBLIC



Eisenhower The Good

by Joseph C. Harsch

December 12, 1960, 25 cents

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

T.R.B. *from* *Washington*

Something Sometimes Happens

★ Sometimes we wonder if Christianity has lost its punch. Communism is crusading; is Christianity? Christ's birthday is a shopping spree; church-going is a status symbol; ministers repeat revolutionary precepts by rote in church, are silent outside. How many "Christians" really know what the word means?

Then when we are most discouraged something sometimes happens. A Christian pacifist, Dr. Willard Uphaus, serves a year in jail in New Hampshire (he will be released Dec. 14) to defend simple decency for all of us. (It must be Christianity, or something, that makes a man do that.) And in New Orleans a Methodist minister, Lloyd Foreman, backed by a Catholic priest, Jerome Drolet, escort a little white child to an integrated school, reviled and spat upon by a Golgothan mob. (There must be *something* to it, don't you think, to behave like that?)

This Business of Reform

★ There have been a couple of fine TV documentaries recently, with more to come. "Harvest of Shame," an hour-long CBS show narrated by Ed Murrow, made millions understand the degradation and near slavery of illiterate migrant workers carted from Florida to harvest northern crops, filthy, schoolless and at starvation wages. Then NBC's retrospective look at the U-2 incident, with its chaos and vacillation, narrated quietly by Chet Huntley but with the same undercurrent of indignation.

In many areas the new communications media give the news background much better than miserable local papers, and that is why *Time* and *Newsweek* with all their inadequacies, have such a sale. We were encouraged, too, by a piece on "Socialized Medicine" by Edward Korry, in the current *Look* magazine, that comes right out and says, yes, the system does work – and work fine – in Britain. President Eisenhower, it notes, has been using socialized medicine "most of his life."

Maybe we attach too much importance to it, but the *Look* piece seems to us like a portent. At long last the ice is going out. For all the AMA's frantic opposition the logic of putting health service for the elderly under Social Security can't be denied (we notice that even the consulting expert of the Eisenhower National Goals Commission recommends it, though of course the Commission doesn't. Commissions who write about "goals" usually are the last to find out about them.)

This business of reform has always fascinated us. Small magazines like *The New Republic* keep hammering for years. Nobody listens. The little group keeps hammering. Finally a new day dawns, seemingly like all the others. But suddenly a major voice, in a tone of discovery, plops for the particular reform, and from the multitude (nearly always) comes the bored response, "Of course, naturally! We've *always* believed that." When did they really start believing it – when did the change occur? Nobody can say. Did the little band of militants do it? Possibly, but who knows. And don't omit one other factor – we can testify to it from personal knowledge! – a certain irritation on the part of a dedicated minority, when it finds itself in a majority and has to share its beloved baby with all the world. . . . This doesn't happen, of course, very often.

Washington Agog

★ We were one of a group of reporters gathered around a news ticker last week as the stories came in about Kennedy, his appointments, his informal bareheaded announcements. We don't know what particular item it was that set it off, but suddenly somebody emitted a long breath, and with a Gee-whizz note, like a child looking at a Christmas tree, exclaimed, "Boy, there sure is going to be a difference around here!" The appointment of the fine, young Congressman from Arizona, Stewart Udall, as Secretary of the Interior, seems certain, and there are signs that the brilliant AFL-CIO counsel, Arthur Goldberg, may be Secretary of Labor.

We think that is the big story in Washington right now – the change in atmosphere. Kennedy's mistakes are all ahead of him (and what fun we'll have chastising him). But now Washington is agog over something else: the ship of state slowly gaining headway after its long drift, preparing to move forward again under a cloud of sail, with a young hand at the tiller.

Protected President

★ We heartily dislike the plan attributed to Kennedy of putting live evening press conferences on the air. If Kennedy wants to revive FDR's fireside chats – fine, but he shouldn't use the press conference as a vehicle. They are something different. The best press conference is the one where reporters remain anonymous, where they can ask unself-conscious questions without being unpaid radio or TV actors, and without having their names pinned to their spontaneous inquiries. Eisenhower brought TV into the affair and formalized the press conference; we always thought it a mistake.

Eisenhower has not seen the press since September 7 – three months. Whereas FDR in peacetime had twice-a-week conferences, Eisenhower has had only 15 this year. He doesn't read papers, or at least carefully. Sometimes when asked about a current happening he looks at his questioner with a face as blank as an unstamped envelope. We remember when Truman's assistant, John Steelman, was told in early 1953 that Eisenhower would not preside at the morning White House staff conferences when the news of the day is discussed. Steelman just couldn't believe it. Sherman Adams' forthcoming book will show he didn't take the initiative in 'protecting" Eisenhower; the President wanted it.

Thought: Goldwater's charge that Communism flourishes where college fraternities aren't allowed shows him up as basically ridiculous; he has no political future.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THE NEW REPUBLIC *A Journal of Opinion Volume 143 Number 25 Issue 2405 December 12, 1960*
Published weekly (except for omissions of four summer issues) and distributed by The New Republic, *1244 19th St., N.W., Washington 6, D. C. Phone: FEderal 8-2494. Single copy 25c. Yearly subscription, $8.00; Foreign, $9.00, Armed Forces personnel or students, $5.00. Advertising rates upon request. Subscribers desiring change of address should notify us at least three weeks in advance. Include old and new address* *Copyright© 1960, by Harrison-Blaine, Inc.* *Item g. Second class Imprint, reading Second Class Postage Paid at Washington, D. C.*

Comrades Up in Arms

THE WEEK

3. Comrades Up In Arms; Bell to Budget; Robert Kennedy; Chicago's Free Press; Trouble in Caracas; The Whole Truth – Someday; Gravy on the Side; National Goals; 16th Century Summitry

ARTICLES

10. Distressed Areas, Distressed People by the Editors

11. Mr. Anderson's Trip to Bonn by Terence Prittie

13. Eisenhower The Good by Joseph C. Harsch

15. The Case against Micawberism by James H. Mullen

17. Africa and the Kennedy Era by Helen Kitchen

10. The Superficial Aspect by Gerald W. Johnson

21. Politics of the Mind by Herbert J. Stern

DEPARTMENTS

23. Books *27. Movies*
28. Art *30 Correspondence*

THE STAFF

Gilbert A. Harrison, Editor & Publisher
Helen Fuller, Managing Editor
Selig S. Harrison, Associate Editor
Robert Evett, Books & the Arts Editor
F. R. Ruskin, Assistant to the Publisher

Contributing Editors:
Alexander M. Bickel, Robert Brustein, Frank Getlein, B. H. Haggin, Irving Howe, Christopher Jencks, Gerald W. Johnson, Stanley Kauffmann Helen Hill Miller, Michael Straight

For three weeks, representatives of 81 Communist Parties from throughout the world met in Moscow to compose the quarrel between the Soviet Union and China. A perfunctory communique issued on December 1 said that the participants had "familiarized themselves with each other's views and positions" and "unanimously" adopted a statement (which at this writing is yet to be released). But the length of the meeting and the nature of the controversy itself make it unlikely that any genuine reconciliation has been achieved.

The Chinese have not been arguing that global war is inevitable, or desirable; only that the Soviet edge in strategic weaponry permits a much bolder policy and that, as classical Leninist dogma affirms, wars of one kind or another are inherent in the imperialist system – wars for markets and spheres of influence, wars between the imperialist powers and their colonies struggling for liberation, civil wars of emancipation within capitalist countries. They agree with the Russians that the West is now deterred by Soviet military prowess from an aggressive war against socialism, *i.e.*, the USSR, but they insist that *local* wars are inescapable – particularly in what they call the colonial and semi-colonial areas. As Liu Chang Sheng phrased it on June 8: "The question of whether war can be averted, in our opinion, refers mainly to a world war . . . The wars in Vietnam, in Algeria, in Egypt over the Suez Canal, and in Cuba . . . such wars are unavoidable. The belief that wars of this kind can be avoided is entirely wrong." As evidence, the Chinese offer the British-French-Israeli attack on Egypt in 1956, Western troop landings in the Middle East in 1958, and the current possibility (in their view) of American armed action against Cuba. Here is proof, they say, that the West will not peacefully accept change that is to its disadvantage. The Communist bloc, on the other hand, should support change that is to *its* advantage; support, in other words, the "just" wars of nationalist revolutionaries for "colonial liberation" (*i.e.*, independence for Algeria). They downgrade the danger of such limited wars getting out of hand, because they believe the West dare not chance thermonuclear destruction. Should the West nevertheless risk such destruction, the Chinese are confident the Communist bloc could win a meaningful victory, and that China, with its population cushion, might emerge as the potentially greatest power.

The Soviets seem at once more resilient and more restrained: Revolutionary struggles must be waged, but without the bloc's taking inordinate risks. The peace forces (to quote *Pravda* of November 23)

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

"even now surpass the forces of war" and "will continue to grow with every day. . . . There is a realistic possibility of the prevention of war." The Russians too cite the Suez crisis of 1956 and the Anglo-American landings in the Middle East in 1958, but infer from those events that fear of Soviet military power effectively inhibits the West. A flexible but aggressive diplomacy, mass pressure on Western governments, appeals to anti-colonialism, economic offensives, Soviet military power, the class struggle and the inherent contradictions in capitalism – all combine to ensure ultimate victory. Khrushchev has said that if he cannot negotiate with the next US administration, he will wait for another, and if necessary, still another.

But time, Peking says, will not be on the bloc's side in the absence of more vigorous revolutionary tactics. Look, they say, you have befriended Nehru, Nasser and Kassim, and with what reward: all are sitting on the fence in the cold war; all are cracking down on local Communist Parties; all are exploiting aid from the Soviet Union to build up a state capitalism capable of obstructing Communist revolution.

In the colonial areas which are not yet independent, the Chinese believe the bloc should join with extremist nationalists, local Communists, or elements which can be brought under Communist control; if moderates are allowed to lead "liberation" movements, the Indian and Indonesian experiences will be repeated again and again. Thus, in the Cameroons, the Chinese allied themselves with the extremist movement of the recently-poisoned Felix Moumie; the Russians, on the other hand, dealt with the constitutional regime. The Chinese early embraced the Algerian Provisional Government; the USSR has only lately extended a very ambiguous *de facto* recognition.

"There Is No Marx But Marx, And I Am His Prophet"

Actual prospects for revolution are likewise in dispute. In the judgment of the Chinese, revolution in most countries will have to be violent because ruling elites will not voluntarily surrender power. Mr. Khrushchev does not disagree in principle (and he certainly does not intend to abandon local Communist Parties, or curtail Soviet economic and political warfare or subversion), but he appears more willing to let the fruit ripen until it is ready to drop of its own weight, or perhaps with a slight shake of the tree at an opportune moment. He would prefer to avoid, whenever possible, armed rebellion that might provoke Western intervention and a chain reaction leading, in turn, to world war.

The Chinese are impatient with Khrushchev for not cleaning up the Soviet back yard in Berlin and above all for allowing the Western position in Taiwan to remain intact. They are critical of Russian aid that draws newly independent countries closer to Russia, but not to China – aid, moreover, some of which the Chinese could use themselves. They ask whether Russian disarmament overtures might have the effect of slowing down Chinese nuclear development and perhaps making it harder for Peking to join the nuclear club. Finally, there is potential competition between the two giants for Mongolia. A recent Soviet historical journal recounted instances of unprovoked Chinese attacks on Russian settlements in the Amur during the 17th Century and stoutly defended the Russian presence there. Chinese maps continue to show the Chinese-Outer Mongolian boundary as undefined, though a boundary is defined on Soviet maps. (It is worth recalling that the former Manchu empire included present-day Outer Mongolia, and some Soviet territory as well.)

We are witnessing today the beginning of a prolonged struggle between Moscow and Peking for control of local Communist Parties in Asia, Africa and Latin America and for influence with the governments and peoples of those areas. But the West is not a helpless spectator. Insofar as a Third Force, loose enough to embrace both non-Communist powers and a Marshal Tito, mobilizes its strengths and engages the whole Sino-Soviet world in tough competition, these intra-bloc disputes will have less and less practical significance. For example, a long-term, substantial and shrewdly-executed economic investment in the underdeveloped areas, much of it multilateral, would at least call into serious question, if not refute, the Soviet premise that history is in league with the Communists.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Bell to Budget

When the full implications of the Kennedy campaign are acknowledged to the inner mind, the appointment of David E. Bell as Director of the Budget is seen to have a rare and unexpected fitness. The most comprehensive managerial function within the government has now been entrusted to a practising expert in the economic development of emerging countries. Foreign economic development was the subject Mr. Bell was teaching at the Harvard School of Public Administration and is the field of his most intense interest. One of his most notable achievements in the real world was his supervision of a three-year mission to Pakistan to advise on economic measures helpful to a developing country, with particular reference to budgetary procedures and economic planning. We speak, in referring to the economies of new nations, of "getting them off the ground," and "airborne." Mr. Kennedy spoke of "getting America moving again." To Mr. Bell, these phrases could all mean much the same thing.

The new Budget Director's whole background promises that he may see a national budget of some fourscore billions of dollars as a major propulsive stage for a society, not as a strait jacket for a government. He is 41 years old, six feet four, possessed, it is said, of unusual stamina, endowed by Budget Bureau and White House experience with a panoramic knowledge of the roles of government and a mental road map of the Federal bureaucracy, tactful, articulate, poised, and diligent. It is a negative, but important, fact that he is not a businessman, conditioned to viewing the government as a corporation. Equally important, he knows something of politics from his service on the Truman staff and as a research director for the 1952 Presidential campaign of Adlai Stevenson. Mr. Bell made a first-class reputation in Washington. One colleague describes him, without reservation, as "the most capable man I have ever known." Two describe him, independently choosing exactly the same phrase, as "moderately liberal," one of them adding the footnote that, in his definition, a liberal is "a man with an open mind."

It is reassuring with respect to the immediate situation that a man who knows the budget will have a chance to examine that instrument as it reaches its final formulation according to Eisenhower. It is not widely realized that the first budget in a new administration is made by the previous administration. The untidy result is that a predecessor's doctrine carries over in some measure to the end of the next fiscal year – in this case, from January 20, 1961, to June 30, 1962, in the Kennedy Administration. Even if it restrains all its impulses toward purely political mischief-making for the incoming Democrat, the Eisenhower Administration can be expected to try for a balanced final budget at any cost, although economic realities arising from recessive current trends may make that a wholly unrealistic goal. The result would be to force Mr. Kennedy into conspicuous requests for more money in his first year. It will be good for Mr. Bell to know the background of the old administration's justifications. The situation may not be as sticky as it sounds. Veterans of the process hold that certain things can't be helped in a budget in which, by rough rule, two-thirds is pre-contitioned by existing legislation. Nor is there anything inherently scandalous in going to the Hill with the revised estimates. All administrations do it, even with their own budgets.

Still, room for ideological friction between the old and the new does exist. Mr. Bell is committed by the Democratic campaign to working within the concept of a balanced budget. Yet Mr. Kennedy has said he intends to strengthen defense and expand welfare programs. There is some hope in the Kennedy camp that substantial waste can be found in the Pentagon's labyrinth, but no guarantee exists that enough can be found – quickly, at least – to pay for X billions in spending for more security. Of the new programs, medical care for the aged will require no significant new budget outlay if it is financed by Social Security taxes. Higher minimum wage legislation has no direct impact within the budget. Housing, education and agriculture, to take three of the largest, could cost a lot more money. The requirement on Mr. Kennedy and Mr. Bell is to find that money by economies, by shifts of emphasis within the vast array of budget programs, and by "taking in more" from an accelerated growth.

One hopes that Mr. Bell does not cease to regard the United States as an underdeveloped country, even though the idea may bruise our self-esteem. Yesterday, Pakistan. Now, the USA. Tomorrow, the world?

Robert Kennedy

As of December 5, the trial balloon bearing the legend: Robert Kennedy for Attorney General of the United States – is still aloft, though some have tried to shoot it down. Neither the competence of the President-elect's brother nor fears of nepotism are at issue. Before, during and after the campaign, Robert Kennedy proved that he has will, energy and astuteness. It is absurd, moreover, to penalize, because of family ties, an able man who contributed so much to Democratic victory. It is not nepotism to hire relatives; it becomes nepotism only when an inferior man is appointed because he has the right "connections."

The relevant question, therefore, is where Robert Kennedy might serve the new Administration most usefully and with the least risk of embarrassing the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

incoming President. Specifically, would it be prudent for John Kennedy to choose his brother for a position that is quasi-judicial, one requiring a disciplined respect for the rights of the accused and an aversion to cutting corners in order to secure a public – if not judicial – conviction? There is a second consideration. The Justice Department is responsible for assuring compliance with the Court's desegregation decree; it will be on the receiving end of unimaginable and continuous abuse. The younger Kennedy has shown that he can hold his own in a fight, but might not his presence there needlessly give the enemies of integration one more stick with which to beat the law enforcement agencies of the federal government? It is a pity that the former Governor of Florida, Leroy Collins – so well qualified by character, regional association, legal training, disposition and loyalty to the Court's decrees – appears not to be available for Attorney General.

Robert Kennedy's dilemma is awkward and unprecedented. No matter what nominal position he accepts, he does so knowing that many who wish to get to the President will think the brother is their most direct and reliable route. If he were to become Chairman of the Democratic National Committee (a position for which his experience has qualified him), every large financial contribution to the Committee would take on a new meaning – or be given one. If he were a member of the Cabinet, whatever the job, his word would be given exceptional weight, for reasons not intrinsic to the value of his thought.

And yet, with his flair for politics and his ambition for public service, it is mean to suggest that Robert Kennedy should retire to Bermuda or to a farm in the country for the next eight years.

Chicago's Free Press

Republican frenzy at John F. Kennedy's victory in Illinois by an as yet unofficial miscroscopic 8,849 votes has loosed forces in that city even more violent than the tempests that raged around the Gothic *Tribune* tower during the triumph of the Rooseveltian New Deal and during the moments of decision when Republican Party Presidential king-makers rejected Douglas MacArthur and the late Robert A. Taft. Reduced to its simplest terms, the Republicans demand that Chicago votes must be counted again and again until somehow they can be arranged to make them add to a Richard Nixon majority.

The determination to refuse acceptance of an election result, or at least to impugn the integrity of the result, no matter what a recanvass may show, has become possible only through the circumstance that Chicago, although the nation's largest city, no longer has the essential Democratic safeguard of an opposition press. The "independent" labels to which Chicago newspapers cling have lost all meaning. The decisions made in Tribune Tower for *The Chicago Tribune* and *The American* and those made by Marshall Field, Jr., in his new journalism cathedral on the river for both his *Sun-Times* and *The Chicago Daily News* have foreclosed any possibility of compelling or inducing a calm and fair examination of the Illinois vote.

The press has taken every cry of fraud, no matter how distorted, completely at face value; has translated every unsupported claim of vote stealing into an imaginary indictment; has terrorized the 20,000 men and women of both parties who gave of their time and services at the polls to conduct an election.

Mayor Daley, belatedly and somewhat clumsily, has challenged the right of a single-viewpoint press in a monopoly situation to convict an entire city of fraud in advance of any official recount and, in advance even of any formal court request for an official recount. Daley used the term "Hitler-like propaganda" to describe the newspapers' acceptance of every Republican charge as a signed and sealed conviction. Ordinarily, the statements of a Mayor of a great city command at least conventional attention, even by a hostile press. Yet it took a most careful reading of the metropolitan Chicago papers last week to discover that Daley had issued statements. Fields' *Daily News*, for instance, buried Daley's reply in the center of page 12 of its major edition while devoting 120-point lines on page one to acceptance of as yet undocumented charges of wholesale fraud. In past years, especially while the senior Marshall Field lived and controlled *The Sun Times*, the Democratic majority in Chicago could expect that criticism of the Cook County machine would be conducted within the rules of responsible journalism. But with the younger Field seeking a philosophical position to the right of Tribune Tower, such rules are out the window. Editor Milburn Akers of *The Sun Times* on occasion has suggested mildly, in his column back in the paper, that perhaps some proof ought to be advanced. But thus far his comments have not interfered with the page one reporting of the charges as fact.

Once the decision to go ahead had been made in Tribune Tower, the campaign to blacken the election record hit the city like a blitzkrieg. *Tribune* Editor W. Don Maxwell deployed George Tagge (his Political Editor), Norma Lee Browning (his chief sob sister), and Bob Weidrich (his crack rewrite man) into commanding positions on the front page. *The Daily News* called upon its Pulitzer Prize winner, George Thiem, for a page one assignment, but Thiem started to drift back into the inside pages after one of his stories, reporting a careful investigation of the Republicans' prime exhibit, the 50th precinct of the 2nd ward, made the mistake of

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

concluding in the final paragraph that any error in this precinct was probably the result of semi-educated judges rather than fraud. This 50th precinct has become just about the only solid peg on which the Republicans have been able to hang their hats. They have claimed that while only 22 voters remain resident there, 84 votes were cast for Kennedy. Since the unfortunate publication of Thiem's conclusion, *The Daily News* has managed to overlook the fact that actual skulduggery has not indeed been shown. The source of the claim that only 22 voters remained resident in the precinct was the unsupported statement of the GOP member of the Chicago election board. The *Tribune* accepted her figure of 22 resident voters as gospel, never bothered to check the figure on its own authority, and in the space of a single column of type used "resident voters" as a first reference, and "registered voters" thereafter. Not even *The Tribune* would argue that there were only 22 registered voters in the precinct but, apparently, anything goes in hot pursuit and the terms were used interchangeably.

The fact that the preliminary recanvassing of Chicago votes and those in the dormitory suburbs on its outskirts thus far have served only to confirm and increase the Kennedy majority has been no deterrent to the press, for the two owners and the four newspapers have assumed that because the Democrats managed to amass a tremendous Chicago majority, there *must* have been fraud. But all hands recoil at the idea of checking the paper ballot boxes of adjacent DuPage County which boasts it is the most Republican county in the United States and which customarily holds back its final precincts until the Republican downstate managers determine how many votes are needed to offset Democratic Cook County. In 1956, for instance, the count in DuPage and its neighbor Kane County, was not completed until 6 a.m. on the morning after election, to squeeze Governor Stratton in by the narrowest margin until the Kennedy vote came along. This time they didn't wait long enough in DuPage, it seems.

Trouble in Caracas

Venezuela is the eighth Latin American nation in recent months to suspend constitutional guarantees and call out troops to suppress riots and ward off a possible invasion. The Army, still loyal to its bargain with President Betancourt, occupied the Central University campus, jailed a number of union leaders, and closed down several opposition newspapers. As an uneasy peace settled over riot-torn Caracas, Betancourt, like Argentina's Frondizi, was forced to place himself unreservedly in the hands of the armed forces to retain the office to which he had been elected two years ago.

Despite dollar revenues of over $100 million a month and a per capita income of $900, the highest in Latin America, the economy of this oil-rich nation of seven million people remains crazily unbalanced. Two-thirds of the population is still illiterate; 300,000 farmers are without land while two percent of the rural population owns 74 percent of the farmland; and a quarter of a million unemployed workers live in appalling slums on the west side of the capital city. Competition from cheap Soviet and Middle Eastern oil, and the slowing down of investment have unbalanced the budget and forced postponement of the government's ambitious development plans. Despite emergency loans of $100 million from the International Monetary Fund and $200 million from a group of 15 US banks this Spring, Betancourt has recently had to devalue the *bolivar*, for many years one of the hardest currencies in the world.

What Venezuela needs is a reduction in its armament budget; the lavish marble and mahogany Officers' Club "sowing the oil"; *i.e.*, spending some of the annual oil revenues on productive public works. But when Betancourt's mentor Romulo Gallegos tried to put such a program into effect in 1947-1948, he was ousted by a *junta* of army officers and wealthy landlords. The much publicized Agrarian Reform Act passed last March has so far been a nullity, affecting only worthless Government-owned tracts and a few plantations taken from Pérez Jiménez and his friends. The big landholdings have not been touched. As for the 10,000-man Army, it still enjoys all its perquisites and writes its own budget; the lavish marble and mahogany Officers' Club in Caracas has to be seen to be believed.

While the usual complaints that "It's all Uncle Sam's fault" are exaggerated, the Eisenhower administration is not without blame. Betancourt's predecessor, Pérez Jiménez, got armaments, loans, and the Legion of Merit from Washington; nobody objected to his tyranny or incredible waste and graft, so long as he paid interest to New York bankers and cooperated with the Creole Petroleum company, a subsidiary of Standard Oil. Moreover, although the Castro mystique has strong appeal in a nation whose problems are so similar to Cuba's, and the Republican Democratic Union (URD), one of the three parties supporting Betancourt, was mildly pro-Castro, Secretary Herter insisted on a condemnation of Cuba at the OAS meeting in San José a few months ago. The URD's Ignacio Luis Arcaya, Venezuela's Foreign Minister who was present at San José, refused to sign the Declaration. Fired by Betancourt, he and his colleagues have gone over to the opposition, weakening the government at a critical period. Meanwhile, after condemning Betancourt's old enemy Trujillo, the US promptly gave Trujillo a big slice of the sugar quota taken from Cuba – an act of hypocrisy which made headlines all over Latin America.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Whole Truth – Someday

The Chet Huntley TV documentary on the U-2 incident (NBC-November 29) brought to mind a small poem by Carl Sandburg giving the retort of a man asked to take the oath prescribed for witnesses. The man pledges to tell the truth and nothing but the truth but adds that the angels would weep for shame if he were to tell the whole truth. Some day the truths that have come to the surface and can be documented about the Powers flight and its aftermath will be put together in a book. It will be of far greater compass than could be handled in one hour of television.

Such a book should deal with the omission of any quiet diplomatic approaches to the Kremlin during the interval between the downing of the plane and the initial revelations by Khrushchev. Were such approaches even considered by this government; and if so, why were they put aside? It should deal explicitly with the reasons for the failure of higher authority to lend guidance to State Department subordinates in the earliest stages of figuring out what to do after the loss of the plane. Is it true that the White House was incapable of offering anything beyond an injunction to spare the President? It should deal with the correlation between Khrushchev's imputation of ineffectuality to the President and the fateful, deferred decision to acknowledge White House responsibility. How far was policy permitted to be determined by pridefulness? It should explore the critical implications of the President's invocation of the word "vital" to justify the flights. Did anyone give competent consideration to the meaning of the term? It should analyze Vice President Nixon's subsequent avowal of a specific intent to continue the overflights. Was he being deceived or deceptive, or was what he said the state of the facts at the moment? It should examine the omission of informal contacts with Khrushchev during the lost weekend at Paris. It should portray the confrontation scene at the Elysee Palace – the irate, vocative Khrushchev, the defensive, silent Eisenhower; the nonplused De Gaulle, and the almost tearfully distressed Macmillan. It should try to evaluate whether the information gained by the overflights ever amounted to a hill of beans anyway – a point left equivocal in the hearings on Capitol Hill.

Within its limits, the NBC documentary deserves high marks. It made vivid the idea of organized incompetence and schemed heedlessness. The Greek-chorus effects of pictorial quotations from Senators Fulbright and Goldwater and Congressman Bowles were excellent – Goldwater performing with all the cogency of a magpie. The central figure of interest was James Hagerty – a proficient man up against problems hugely beyond his ken, trying to cover up inadequacy with smug candor. At last he is asked to state the lesson to be drawn from the whole sad affair. He mouths a moral: "Don't get caught." What a canon for public conduct! What a standard for an Administration so addicted to discourse about morality!

Gravy on the Side

In its hearings on the Mutual Security Bill last spring the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate tackled what it described as "the scandalous black market currency activities of large numbers of American officers (including colonels) and servicemen in Turkey." The remedy proposed by the Committee was moderate – merely discretionary authorization for our Ambassadors to foreclose the payment in dollars of United States personnel in situations rife with temptation to make a fast buck by money manipulation. This idea was opposed as harsh by the Pentagon's spokesmen. The Committee found them reluctant to bring out details. In the end the Committee pressed out some facts, but the disclosures, published in the Committee's report, caused small stir. Most of the press ignored them. *The New York Times* gave adequate coverage but relegated the story to page 30.

With the approach of a new Administration, the Committee's views are still in point. The report expressed disappointment in "the performance of the Department of Defense." It cited "the fact that of 71 uniformed personnel . . . questioned by military investigators, 21 pleaded the military equivalent of the fifth amendment and 37 admitted having acquired *lira* illegally" – all of these at one post – "and indications that the situation might have been equally bad" at others. The Committee deplored a "widespread attitude . . . that Americans generally, and American military personnel in particular, are, or should be, above the law when they are away from home." It inveighed against a disposition "to regard blackmarketing as a game in which one gets rich if he wins and gets transferred if he is caught."

Other temptations besides the opportunity to manipulate currency are likely to assail official Americans abroad – such as the use of attaché and military advisory group planes for uncalled-for and unscrutinized shopping tours, the abuse of free-entry privileges by members of various missions, and the diversion of commissary supplies to local purveyors.

These petty abuses have dragged on for years, earning for the United States discredit far in excess of the profit to the illicit beneficiaries. A firm word – no more bartering of the good name of the US – from a new President to his principal subordinates in charge of overseas operations would go all down the line and do a lot of good.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

National Goals

Not being able to decide whether to preach a sermon or prescribe policies for the sixties, the Report of the President's Commission on National Goals does both. It begins and ends with some conjuring phrases about the infinite worth of every individual, but in between there are practical hints on what these infinitely valuable individuals banded together as finite folks have got to do if the country is to progress.

The Report is introduced with a blast of trumpets about the Declaration of Independence: a "soaring vision [that] enabled our society to meet the trials of emerging nationhood." That is a romantic presumption. The Declaration of Independence was a manifesto issued as an act of psychological warfare. The governing instrument of our national life, to which the Report does not refer by name, is the Constitution, the preamble of which outlines the operative goals of the society. The individual may be of ultimate worth in the sight of God, and in some ultimate sense the individual may be all that counts, but so far as the State is concerned his worth and his freedom and his dignity are less than absolute and always constrained by circumstances. The State has no ultimate end, it has a whole set of ends, for the State is a make-do arrangement. Where the Report is of value, it deals with policies, rather than philosophy.

Silly, not to say inaccurate, statements abound – "Our material achievements . . . represent a triumph of the spirit of man and the mastery of his material environment"; "Ours is a spiritually-based society"; "Americans must demonstrate in every aspect of their lives the fallacy of a purely selfish attitude – the materialistic ethic." They lead one to speculate on the qualities Mr. Eisenhower had in mind in selecting the men (there are no women) for this task. (Incidentally, although the Report does not say so, one of the Commission's members, Learned Hand, resigned before the Report was prepared; another of the 11 members, Clark Kerr, was kept by illness from participating personally in its discussions; and a third, George Meany, attended only the earliest preliminary sessions.) The President was perhaps most concerned to secure distinguished citizens: bright but not dazzling; progressive but conservative; non-partisan but not non-political; conscientious but not controversial. In brief, distinguished. At least the Report is consistent with that intent. It is humane, high-minded and vague. It expresses a consensus of moderates, of men who have public roles to play, pressures and personal ambitions to consider.

And yet, there are good points. The Report bequeaths to the new President a scriptural text from which he may quote to give authority and respectability to one or another program he may have in mind. Like the Bible, the Report can be used to support a variety of viewpoints and is thus comparable to the Rockefeller Brothers Reports, so useful to the Democrats in the last campaign. The Commission affirms that "the economy should grow at the maximum rate consistent with primary dependence upon free enterprise and the avoidance of marked inflation. Increased investment in the public sector is compatible with this goal." It says that we must seek to "keep unemployment consistently below 4 percent of the labor force." (In October, 1960, the unemployment rate, seasonally adjusted, was 6.4 percent of the force.) It says that "extension of medical insurance is necessary, through both public and private agencies." It concedes that "we should be prepared to negotiate [with the Communists] on any reasonable basis." It rather favors disarmament, the United Nations, the Organization of American States, military alliances, international inspection, etc.

As the last testament of the Eisenhower Administration, it should be received with gratitude by that Administration's successor. Its rhetoric will not be emblazoned in bronze (even the gods didn't know how to be Olympian in committee), but the thoughts are of a higher order than those to which the last eight years have accustomed us.

16th Century Summitry

Mr. Khrushchev has said many things lately, but there may be a few thoughts he is reserving to express privately to the next President of the United States; it is fairly predictable that President Kennedy will meet with the Soviet Premier before the next year has ended. It occurs to us that those responsible for preparing the path to that Summit might find some guidance in the procedure followed in 1561, when efforts were made by English and Scottish statesmen alike to bring about a Summit conference between Queen Elizabeth and her rival, Mary Queen of Scots.

Both queens were interested. William Cecil, Elizabeth's chief adviser, and Maitland of Lethington, for Mary, were put into communication with each other. According to J. E. Neale, in his biography, *Queen Elizabeth I*, "Elizabeth told Maitland and Cecil to correspond freely and confidentially, each with the knowledge of his mistress, in order that the way to an agreement might be explored before uttering it to the world. The correspondence went on . . . Maitland was constantly expostulating. 'Many things may pass between us two', he wrote, which neither Mary nor Elizabeth 'will for the first face write to one another'. 'I pray you let us not weary to push forward till they have met, when I doubt not one of them shall so govern the other that they shall thereafter need no mediators' . . ."

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THE MEANING OF MOVING FORWARD – IV

Distressed Areas, Distressed People

"The next President of the United States must promptly set forth a sound legislative and Executive program launching an all-out attack on poverty in this prosperous country. We have the abundance eventually to eliminate poverty, if we will – but it will take effective policies of full employment, a higher minimum wage, better . . . jobless pay . . . aid to depressed areas . . ."

– John F. Kennedy, September 20

Unemployment Compensation

Equity, economics and politics, all combine to give broadened unemployment compensation high priority in the legislative program of the Kennedy Administration. In 1958, when unemployment was the largest since 1941, the unemployment compensation system proved conspicuously inadequate. In an average month, 4,681,000 people were unemployed, but only 2,758,000 received unemployment compensation. Today, proportionally fewer of the jobless are covered. In June through September 1960, *less than half* of the unemployed received unemployment compensation. And that unemployment, which had been hovering for several years around five percent, went up to the seasonably adjusted rate of 6.4 percent in October. More than four and one-half million were out of work.

In 1958, some $14 billion was paid out in unemployment compensation, or less than $17 per week, when averaged over all those who were officially designated as unemployed. Payments should have been at least twice that amount – given unemployment averaging 4,681,000 – if the insurance system were to fulfill its dual mission of providing equitable compensation to those involuntarily thrown out of work, and help in stabilizing economic activity when the normal flow of earned income drops.

Such compensation is, of course, subject to abuse. Some persons choose to work only part-time and get all the unemployed pay they can. This abuse may multiply as coverage is widened and benefits increased as well as prolonged. But, in so far as abuses cannot be spotted and removed, they will have to be endured for larger gains. National defense is not starved because its annual $45 billion outlay includes some waste. Neither can we balk at some unjustified payments in a compensation system that might involve total outlays of eight or nine billion dollars in a very bad year.

As matters stand, unemployment compensation suffers from numerous serious defects: standards differ wildly from state to state, sums are inadequate, and coverage periods are too short. Tighter Federal standards, more consistent procedures, and larger allowances are urgently needed. The key lies in legislation to establish Federal standards; adoption of these would narrow the inordinate present disparities from state to state.

The duration of unemployment benefits currently ranges from a minimum of six plus weeks in Indiana to a maximum of 39 weeks in Oklahoma. Most states have a maximum duration of 26 weeks. The same range exists with regard to benefits themselves, with the basic weekly stipend ranging from a possible low of $3 in Missouri to a possible high of $55 in California.

Distressed Areas

Persistent unemployment concentrated where automation has displaced workers or where older industries have decayed and new industries have not replaced them – this, in human terms, is the so-called "distressed areas" problem. Down the Appalachian mountains, from New York to South Carolina, community after community has been left stranded as coal mining has been mechanized or abandoned. Areas in New England that have been largely deserted by the textile industry are in comparable difficulties. Exhaustion of resources such as ore and timber have turned once-lively communities into ghost towns. These are depressants on the economy, and will remain so until new sources of livelihood are created, and workers and young people are trained – and retrained – for new skills.

President Eisenhower in 1958 called for a $50 million program of federal loans to distressed communities; Congress countered with a proposal for a $280 million combination of loans and grants, which Mr. Eisenhower vetoed. In 1959, the Senate, early in the session, passed a $390 million aid-to-depressed-area measure (trimmed to $251 million by the House Banking and Currency Committee) but the bill languished in the House Rules Committee throughout the rest of that session and on into the next. Finally, in May, 1960, it got to the floor only by use of the "Calendar Wednesday" procedure – an unusual parliamentary maneuver which had not been used for a decade. Once on the floor, the measure passed, and the Senate accepted the reduction in the interest of speed and in hope of avoiding a Presidential veto. But on May 13, the President sent it back, and the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Senate proved unable, by 11 votes, to muster the two-thirds endorsement necessary to override his veto.

The substance of Democratic bills has been the provision of loans or grants by the federal government to communities that are attempting to renovate themselves through the development of industrial plants and the retraining of workers. The grants would be available either to communities which have exhausted their capacity to develop new economic activity, or to areas where the problem is too large to be handled locally. Loans form the far larger part of the proposed appropriations. It is the $390 million, 1959 Senate bill which should, in our view, now be reintroduced. By writing separate and self-contained distressed areas or area redevelopment legislation (rather than including such relief in an omnibus "pork barrel" Rivers and Harbors bill) – criteria can be set forth which assure the funds are put to most effective use. An industry encouraged to relocate or to start fresh in such areas (or given incentives to return if it has left) must show a reasonable expectation of remaining, and not come as a result of pirating from other areas; the communities must qualify under attested standards as to the duration and the intensity of unemployment; the plan must include retraining provisions to enable stranded workers from the old industry to meet the requirements of the new. Under such provisions communities would be protected from such log-rolling pressures as are applied to items in the Rivers and Harbors Bill.

Minimum Wage

Minimum wage levels bear little relation to present price levels (the present floor, laid down by the Congress, is a dollar an hour), and only 23.7 million employees are covered. While the distressed areas bill failed in the August special session of Congress because it was vetoed, legislation to reform the Fair Labor Standards Act failed because the House and Senate were unable to agree.

The Administration had proposed bringing in some 3.2 million more workers under the $1 umbrella. It also requested an increase of 10 to 15 cents in the hourly wage of those already protected. In the House, the Education and Labor Committee reported a bill adding some 3.4 million more to the program, and raising the wage for all to $1.25; as finally passed by the House, the bill provided a raise to $1.15 for those already covered, and brought in 1.4 million workers (those working for retail chains in interstate commerce) at a $1 level.

On the Senate side, the Labor and Public Welfare Committee recommended coverage for 5 million more workers and a level of $1.25 for all. Its effect would have been felt most by families subsisting on less than $2,000 a year, particularly in broken homes where mothers work at unskilled and often part-time jobs. After a number of amendments had been considered, a bill covering some 4 million people at the $1.25 level was passed.

But when the Senate conferees (headed by Senator Kennedy) met with their House counterparts, the House members held fast to their version, and on August 30 the conference broke up with no bill and with Senator Kennedy the victim of a major campaign embarrassment. Now the President-elect is expected to press once again for enactment of legislation incorporating the Senate liberalizations.

HOW TO REPEL A "SURPRISE ATTACK"

Mr. Anderson's Trip to Bonn

Bonn

The demands which Secretary Anderson and Mr. Dillon brought with them to Bonn on November 21 can be put under four main headings – direct West German payments for American troops in Germany, an increased German contribution to the NATO infrastructure, German aid for underdeveloped countries, and German importation of more US farm produce. The amount of direct West German aid for US troops demanded is not known. It was not more than 2500 million marks, and Mr. Anderson may have been prepared to settle for much less. He got nothing. The Americans are believed to have proposed that West Germany's share of NATO infrastructure costs should increase from 13.7 percent to 22 percent, while the American share should be brought down from 36 percent to 25 percent. This would have entailed West Germany up-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ping its contribution by 250 to 300 million marks. It seems probable the German contribution will be boosted to around 160 million marks, an 18 percent increase. But a settlement of this point may have to wait until the meeting of the NATO Council in Paris in mid-December.

As far as aid to the underdeveloped countries was concerned, Mr. Anderson asked for an annual West German contribution out of budgetary resources of 2000 million marks. The German aid program for 1961 foresees total aid of 3500-3800 million marks, but less than 1000 million of this sum will come from budgetary resources. West German industry will contribute 1500 million marks, and other sums will come from the states, from the sale of Volkswagen shares when this motor-car firm is sold by the government in January, and from unexpended European Recovery Program funds. The Bonn government stuck to its own aid plans and refused to commit itself to making a fixed annual payment.

Finally, with regard to imports of American farm products, the West German Government could only express readiness "in principle" to lower tariffs and liberalize import quotas. This would entail consultations with the other five countries of the Common Market. German spokesmen pointed out that 1960 imports of farm produce were 1200 million marks higher than those in 1959. A further increase in the course of 1961 is certain.

While great efforts have been made to emphasize that the Bonn talks were conducted in a friendly atmosphere, the American demands were turned down with the utmost firmness and the West German Government emerged from the talks without having made a single concession which had not been indicated before Anderson and Dillon arrived. As the Christian Democratic paper, *Rheinische Post*, wrote on November 24, the West German aim was to "repel" the "surprise" American attack and to dispel "exaggerated" American notions of German ability to pay more for defense. There was one overriding reason for an attitude which seemed to border on obstinacy. Next September there will be a federal election in West Germany. Dr. Adenauer's Finance Minister, Franz Etzel, informed him that any fresh financial commitments would mean bitterly unpopular raises in corporation and income taxes. With Berlin's Lord Mayor Willy Brandt in the van of the Social Democratic election campaign, the Christian Democrats might be in trouble.

The West Germans produced plenty of other arguments, however. Direct payments for American troops, they said, would lead to British and French demands for similar financial aid. On November 22, West German newspapers eagerly lapped up agency reports that the British Government was already drawing up a list of its demands.

Unfortunately, they did not trouble to publish the emphatic denial which came from the British Embassy in Bonn. The West Germans argued that they should bear only a part of the extra costs arising out of the proposed cutting of the American share of NATO infrastructure expenditure from 36 percent to 25 percent. They would contribute 4.3 percent of this additional 11 percent; the remaining 6.7 percent could be shared by Britain, France and other NATO powers. With regard to aid for underdeveloped countries the German view was that budgetary allocations could only be made when the budget was prepared, and not for several years in advance. The West German Government was, moreover, genuinely proud of its 1961 aid program.

The Germans do not, of course, agree that they are giving less for the common defense than their European neighbors (the annual contributions of the West German citizen is $40, whereas those of the British and French citizen are both around $100). They argue that the Federal Republic must pay 1500 million marks a year for the upkeep of West Berlin, and larger unspecified sums for the integration of East German refugees.

And they consider that such payments should be taken into account, as contributions towards NATO's principal objective – the defense of the free world against Communism. This argument has some validity; others have less. The West German press, for instance, was instructed to write that the Federal Republic is one of the most "heavily-indebted" countries in the world. Thanks to the wiping out of most of the internal German debt after the war that is not true. Internal Federal and State debts are slightly over 20,000 million marks – an insignificant sum compared with the British National Debt.

Another German argument – that their gold and dollar reserves are not disproportionately high is equally fallacious. Last month they were 31,500 million marks – nearly double the British reserves, which have to serve for the whole sterling area.

At some stage Western Germany will have to increase its contribution to the Western Alliance. The *Rheinische Post* recognized this quite clearly on November 24: "In the long term Bonn cannot avoid helping to iron out the American balance of payments problem by making some sacrifice." The "long term" means the end of next year, when the Federal Election is over. In the meantime, Bonn would only yield to pressure, if it came from other NATO partners as well as from the US. But this will not happen; for no other NATO country, after all, wants to add to its own defense burden.

Terence Prittie

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Eisenhower The Good

by Joseph C. Harsch

In former times Kings and Princes acquired popular descriptive labels which have clung to them ever since. There was Charles "The Bald," Charles "The Bold" and Charles "The Great," Edward "The Confessor," "Saint" Louis, Richard "The Lionhearted," John "Lackland" and "Bloody" Mary. One obscure Anglo-Saxon King has come down to us as "The Unready," although this may be a language corruption rather than a reflection on his military behavior.

It is interesting that none was ever popularly known as both "good" and "great."

It is of course premature to pass judgment on the career of Dwight D. Eisenhower, but as the third of his three public careers comes to its appointed end the presumption is permissible that by medieval standards of nomenclature he would be known as Eisenhower The Good, rather than as Eisenhower The Great.

He has been popular with, and trusted and respected by, the people. This is attested by the fact that they twice elected him to their highest magisterial office and presumably would have been happy to do so a third time had the opportunity been constitutionally available. Similarly popular princes were in times past usually given the title of "Good."

The title "Great" has been reserved for princes of massive authority and spectacular successes. The specific deeds of those who achieved it were frequently anything but "good" either by our standards or even by those of their own times. Perhaps it is to Mr. Eisenhower's credit that future historians are unlikely to refer to him as "great." His reputation for goodness is challenged only by a few known incidents such as his hesitation to dispense with the services of Sherman Adams after that gentleman's indiscretions with Mr. Goldfine. And that, after all, could be put down to loyalty to a faithful courtier and loyalty is a "good" quality, although to admit it here would be to admit it also for Harry Truman's more frequent loyalties to questionably deserving associates.

There are three flaws in Dwight Eisenhower's title to greatness which future historians are more likely to notice than do his contemporaries. One belongs to each of his three careers as soldier, politician and statesman. In each case the flaw can measure the difference between a distinguished career and a truly great career.

Eisenhower the Soldier led, or presided over, an enormous, complex and decisively successful military operation which began on the shores of North Africa and ended with the German surrender at Rheims. But there is a question whether he ranks with the great military commanders of history. The question arises out of the conviction of many who served in high rank under his command that he missed the one great opportunity to exercise the essential and decisive quality of command at the moment when the exercise of it could have shortened the war by six months and produced victory for the Western Allies well before the Russian armies had broken into central Europe.

After the successful Normandy landing and the spectacular sweep across France, Hitler's western armies were broken and scattered. Had the momentum of the Allied advance been maintained, Eisenhower's armies would certainly have swept across the Rhine and deep into Germany. There was no organized defense at the Siegfried Line or behind the Rhine ready to contest the Allied advance. It came to a halt in the mud of the Rhineland, and the Second World War dragged on into the following spring.

At the time of the halt Eisenhower possessed in Patton and Montgomery two of the great field commanders of all time. Each believed that he could maintain his advance across the Rhine and sweep on into Germany if given all available support. There wasn't enough fuel or ammunition reaching the front at that time to keep both going. Each wanted to keep on and each clamored for the supplies and the permission. They were passionately jealous and fiercely competitive rivals.

Eisenhower did not make a choice between Patton and Montgomery. He divided his supplies between them and ordered them to advance in step along a "broad front." The decision was presented at the time, and defended since, as the prudent course of action. It also avoided the prickly problem of making the choice between Patton and Montgomery. One was American and the other British. National pride would have been bitterly hurt had the one been favored over the other. Also, while both were magnificent battle leaders and

---

JOSEPH C. HARSCH, *author of* Pattern of Conquest *and* The Curtain Isn't Iron, *for many years wrote for the* Christian Science Monitor. *He has been a CBS news commentator, specializing in foreign affairs, and is now in London as Senior European Correspondent for NBC.*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

fighters, they were also both prima donnas. It was probably politically impossible to hobble and starve the one and release the other. But it might conceivably have been possible to cajole or coerce the two into working as a team.

Montgomery was probably bluffing when he offered to serve, if necessary, under Patton. Yet it was a bluff which might have been called. There were other possible devices, such as the alternating command system which worked so successfully with Spruance and Halsey in the far Pacific. One can't help feeling that a Marlborough, a Wellington or a Napoleon would have found the solution to the problem. Dwight Eisenhower did not find it, and the Russians reached Berlin, Prague and Vienna before the armies of the West. Much sorrow has flowed from that sequence.

Eisenhower the Politician led, or presided over, two enormously successful presidential election campaigns for the Republican Party. Events proved beyond doubt that there was never the slightest question about the outcome of the first campaign. There wasn't much serious question at the time. Yet when his more timorous advisers urged him to avoid offending Senator Joseph McCarthy, Eisenhower put away a passage he had prepared for a speech in which he paid his respects to his former commanding officer, General Marshall.

George Marshall had for many years been Dwight Eisenhower's friend, patron and supporter. It was Marshall who picked Eisenhower for the North African campaign, who defended Eisenhower in Washington after the first failure at Kasserine Pass and during the tempest over the Darlan-de Gaulle affair and who gave Eisenhower the Normandy invasion command. Eisenhower would probably have ended the war as an obscure division commander had it not been for George Marshall. There were other debts which are not yet on the public record.

McCarthy had attacked Marshall, brutally and wickedly. Eisenhower's impulse and intention was to speak in Marshall's defense. He owed Marshall far more than he owed any other living man. For the sake of an alleged few votes, he allowed himself to be persuaded to keep silent. So far as we know today George Marshall never discussed the incident with anyone. He died, in silence. Eisenhower's debt to Marshall stands unpaid.

Eisenhower the Statesman led, or presided over, a phase of what appeared to be gradually-improving relations between the United States and the Soviet Union. The trend of events through the meeting at Camp David seemed to be moving in a promising direction.

On the first of May in 1960, when Eisenhower's Presidency still had nine months to go, an American reconnaissance aircraft was brought down inside the Soviet Union. Eisenhower was scheduled to meet Nikita Khrushchev in Paris two weeks later. Eisenhower's record as a peacemaker and a statesman depended on the outcome of that meeting in Paris.

It is official Washington doctrine that Nikita Khrushchev intended to wreck the Summit before he reached it. What is not known is the date on which the decision was taken in Moscow to wreck the Summit. There is interesting and impressive evidence that the decision was taken only at the last minute, and only after Mr. Eisenhower had personally and publicly claimed responsibility for the U-2 mission and publicly asserted that the flights would continue.

It is also contended that the Summit was a foregone failure and that the West ended up ahead of the game because it never took place. This is possible. The fact is, however, that until the time of his assumption of personal responsibility for the U-2 flight Dwight Eisenhower was an influential force in world affairs. Whether he might have been able to use his influence for good during the remaining months of his term of office is problematical, but it was a respected influence. It disappeared from world affairs at the moment that he assumed personal responsibility.

That action ended Eisenhower's influence with his Allies as suddenly as it did in Moscow. The Allies were aghast – not of course at the reconnaissance flights, in which they had participated and which their governments entirely approved, but at the Eisenhower assumption of personal responsibility for them, which violated all standard procedure in such cases and which certainly provided Khrushchev with the perfect weapon for wrecking the Summit even if it did not necessarily cause the wrecking.

There are several explanations offered for the Eisenhower role in the U-2 affair. The most plausible, and the one backed by the most impressive evidence, is that Mr. Eisenhower's political advisers told him that it would be bad domestic politics for him to make the conventional disclaimer, that the Democrats would accuse him of being on the golf course when he should

REPRINTS AVAILABLE

Cuba: A Dissenting Report
by Samuel Shapiro

Single Copy – 50c
25 Copies – $10
50 Copies – $18
100 Copies – $30

THE NEW REPUBLIC
1244 19th Street, N.W. Washington 6, D. C.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

have been minding the store. The Democrats undoubtedly would have done so.

It probably was good domestic politics for the President to assert a personal knowledge of the specific flight, which apparently he actually did not have, and also to assert that the flights would be continued, which they were not. But was it good foreign policy to end abruptly and for all time Mr. Eisenhower's capacity to play a role in foreign affairs? The postscript on his personal influence as a statesman was written in Bonn six months later in the twilight of his Presidency when he sent his emissaries to the Germans asking for help to staunch the flow of gold from the American Treasury. For Dwight Eisenhower the Germans did not have a penny to spare.

The soldier did not harness Patton and Montgomery.

The politician did not defend his greatest benefactor.

The statesman did not survive the U-2 incident to play out his role to the end.

For other reasons he will long be remembered in the hearts of his people as Eisenhower The Good.

For these reasons it is unlikely that future historians will refer to him as Eisenhower The Great.

The Case against Micawberism

by James H. Mullen

Edwin L. Dale, Jr.'s article on the gold exodus, *The Case for Micawberism*, which appeared in the November 28th issue reflects the more optimistic position taken by most European experts that the US balance of payments deficit is a temporary phenomenon caused principally by the currently higher interest rates in Europe which are attracting US capital (mostly short term) abroad. He suggests that this difference is a function of a temporal disparity in business conditions in the two areas – Europe's current boom is pushing interest rates up while our second-half 1960 slump is causing interest rates and stock market quotations to fall off. With business conditions back in phase as we move out of the slump in 1961, the argument goes, interest rates in the US will go up and capital will return to the US. He points with confidence to the likelihood of the US maintaining its current annual export surplus of goods and services at an annual rate of from $3 to $4 billions.

As a result of this analysis Mr. Dale advocates a "let's wait and see" policy. Surely the deficit will not be so great in 1961.

Several basic conditions militate against the wisdom of emulating Mr. Micawber. First of all, while it is quite possible that the US may be able to maintain a trade surplus in the foreseeable future, there is no assurance that it will continue to run between $3 and $4 billion. On the contrary, the trend since the beginning of the European economic recovery has been in the other direction. Western European economies are now growing at an average rate of more than twice our own. Short of imposing drastically higher import duties on foreign goods, they should continue to be attractively priced in comparison with our own both here in the US as well as in world markets. Nor can we assume that our traditional cost advantages in the manufacture of mass fabricated metal products will continue indefinitely. Western Europe's common market of 170 million provides a continuous incentive for standardization and automation with all its concomitant savings in the cost of mass produced consumer products.

Within the common market countries, the economic indicators, almost without exception, point to future prosperity and to growth at a much higher rate than our own: (1) further reductions in internal and external tariffs are scheduled by common market countries in 1961. (2) There is a great untapped demand for consumers' goods on the continent (the present per capita ownership of automobiles, television sets, washing machines, etc., is only a fraction of ours); (3) There has been a rapid adoption of mass selling and consumer credit practices similar to those which have been in existence in the US since the end of World War II; (4) Increased mobility of the European labor forces makes it possible for fully employed areas like West Germany to absorb surpluses from countries like Italy; (5) Further mechanization of the European agricultural economy will gradually release millions for urban industrial employment.

In the near future, the disparity in interest rates is not likely to be reduced significantly. The new admin-

James H. Mullen *is a Consultant in Economics at the Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island.*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

istration faces the prospect of having to ease credit at home in order to counter growing unemployment and other symptoms of a recession carrying well into 1961. While the long-term investment picture is not notably influenced by differences in short-term interest rates, it *is* influenced by the relative attractiveness of US vs. European markets for the next ten years. The growth of long term US investment abroad has been phenomenal in the last three years. Ford's recently announced offer to purchase the remaining 45.4 percent of the stock of its British subsidiary is a good indication of the direction which long-term investment is likely to take. Despite Ford's calculatedly ingenuous statement that the purpose of the $358,400,000 offer was to "achieve greater operational efficiency and greater marketing effectiveness," the real purpose was quite apparent. He now has 54.6 per cent controlling shares of the stock and hence is already free to make any policy decisions he wants to relative to operating efficiency or marketing effectiveness. The real reason is one which any practical businessman cannot afford to overlook. He clearly anticipates a higher return on $358,400,000 invested in Europe than a like amount invested in the US economy. The American car market is super-saturated. Labor costs, distribution and selling costs are much higher here than they are in Europe. The rising per capita income and the low per capita car ownership in Britain and on the continent gives the investment yield of US dollars a much higher potential there than here.

If, then, the basic, underlying trend in trade and capital investment is unfavorable to our efforts to regain a balance of payments, how are we to accomplish this vital task?

We must make some basic decisions and take some fairly imaginative steps soon. The next administration should have ready a plan of action which it can put into effect as soon as it takes office. The first step in such a plan must be to reassure our allies that we do not intend to suspend gold payments or devalue the gold content of the dollar. To this end, the administration must announce its intention to obtain legislation which will give the Federal Reserve Board the power to modify the present 25 percent gold reserve requirement against notes and member bank deposits for a period of as long as two years. Such a law would make it possible to free all or part of the nearly $12 billion of required reserves and would also give notice to the rest of the world of our intention to maintain the convertibility of the dollar despite the possibility of continued losses of gold in the next two years. This in turn should reduce the rate at which foreign dollar balances are being converted into gold. There is an old adage in the banking business that the only time a depositor feels compelled to withdraw his deposit is when he is afraid that he won't be able to.

Reduction of required gold reserves will ease tension but will not eliminate the basic causes of the unfavorable balance of payments. The current deficit is running in the neighborhood of $4 billion per year. Our foreign military aid program is costing us approximately $3 billion per year while our foreign economic aid program is running at about the same figure.

We can reduce the balance-of-payments effect of economic aid significantly by discontinuing the practice of making free dollar grants. Such grants have in effect given the recipient freedom to purchase in any country, and where these purchases have been from other than US sources, it has had the same effect on balance of payments as that of Americans importing goods and services from abroad. If borrowers were restricted to purchasing only US goods and were required to ship only in US bottoms, foreign economic aid would not cause adverse payments.

The present burden of maintaining US military bases abroad is another significant source of adverse balances. The Anderson-Dillon mission to the Bonn Government was foredoomed to failure not so much because of gaucherie on the part of Mr. Anderson or disagreement in objectives between the Treasury and the State Departments as it was because of hard economic facts. The assumption of all or most of the $600 million cost of maintaining US forces in West Germany would have required additional taxes on the West German people and their economy. West Germans are just beginning to taste the fruits of economic recovery. Their present per capita tax burden is already roughly as great as ours is now. To top it all, the Adenauer government is facing a general election in the coming year.

While it is unlikely that Mr. Anderson or his successor will obtain from any of our allies commitments which require them to increase taxes, it is to their interest to help us in any way they can.

The next administration might negotiate for a formal agreement with Germany, Britain, France and other trade-surplus nations to restrict voluntarily a certain percentage of their US dollar balances. This would ease the liquidity problem which the US Treasury now faces without constituting an abrogation on our part of our promise to maintain convertibility. Quotas could be worked out for each nation based on its economic capabilities and the size of its trade surplus. Such an arrangement would not completely freeze foreign dollar balances since they could always be invested in the US or used to purchase US goods. A sliding scale might be set up to provide for reducing the amount of the quota in proportion to each country's increased participation in the military and economic aid effort of the free world. This would provide an additional incentive for them to assume an increasing share of our collective burden.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Africa and the Kennedy Era

by Helen Kitchen

The appointment of Governor G. Mennen Williams as Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs was described by *The Washington Post* as "to say the least, curious." This unorthodox selection may, however, stand up better on second glance. While Senator Kennedy has been criticized by some for appointing an Assistant Secretary of State before naming the Secretary, this was as dramatic a way as can be conceived of telling African leaders to hold onto their hats until January. This timing – and the fact that Williams is noted, in the words of *The Herald Tribune*, for his "galloping liberalism" – could be very important at a time when cynicism about US policy is at an all-time high in some parts of Africa because of our recent open alliance with conservative forces in the Congo dispute. Moreover, the very ebullience and informality which some of Governor Williams' detractors find most unsuitable for such a key diplomatic post is actually one of his strongest qualifications. He might be a bull in a china shop elsewhere, but he is well-suited for bubbling, rough-and-tumble Africa, where "stuffed-shirtism" is inevitably associated with race consciousness. Contrariwise, the very fact that he is a former Governor of a major state six times elected to that office, and so close to the President that he became his first appointment, will give him special entree with every leader in prestige-conscious Africa. Although he comes to the task with superficial knowledge of specific African problems, he is in a position – if properly staffed on the substantive side – to change dramatically the image of the United States which is beginning to take form in Africa. And a change is very much needed.

While it is true that Africa is a vast mosaic of disparate social, economic, and political units, it is nevertheless possible – even vital – to establish a broad conceptual framework for US policy in the 60's toward the whole region. To begin with, one must assume that Africa is going to be populated increasingly by socialist, neutralist, one-party states, but that the African elites creating these new states are responding primarily to indigenous needs, capabilities, and preconceptions of authority. If we have learned anything from the past eight years, it is that it is self-defeating for the United States either to moralize against this emergence or to interpret it subjectively in cold war terms. African neutralism serves Moscow's interests only to the extent that we refuse to associate ourselves with its revolutionary character and to see its great potentiality for keeping Communism out of Africa.

That the continent's principal nationalist leaders – with the notable exception of the Congolese – are remarkably stable, coherent, and well-educated men should be regarded as an important advantage. Bourghiba, Nkrumah, Nasser, Toure, Nyerere, Abubakar, Olympio, Dia, Mboya, to name only some, are the products of a highly selective process and measure up well against any standard of intellectual or leadership capability we might choose to apply. Some of them are greatly attracted to Marxist models and impressed by Soviet and Chinese accomplishments, but even those who lean most toward the Soviet bloc for aid and inspiration think in terms of extrapolating from the Soviet experience to fit their own parochial needs, and have no deliberate intention of delivering their own country or Africa into Soviet hands. This is an important distinction, not, unfortunately, always discerned by Western observers; it requires us – even under apparently discouraging circumstances, as in Guinea – to make it possible for African leaders to draw from Western models and Western technology *when they will* in molding their peculiarly African product. (A case in point is the recent contretemps in Ghana over a London newspaper report that the government was about to nationalize all private industry. In his angry refutation, President Nkrumah reaffirmed his intention to build a "socialist pattern of society" in Ghana but went on to emphasize that it would be a socialist society adapted to Ghanaian needs rather than someone else's stereotype, and that private industry would continue indefinitely to play a key role in Ghana.)

Secretary Dulles' painful failure to bring Egypt to heel by withdrawing support from the Aswan Dam, as well as France's failure to make an example of Guinea by gutting that country after it refused to join the French Community in 1958, made it clear that the time is past when we can manipulate African countries by name-calling or corporal punishment. The Communist bloc stands ever-ready to provide tender care for bruised feelings. In this connection, Secretary Herter's recent statement that Ghana was moving into the Soviet orbit (later hastily softened in a published version) was not only untrue in African terms but also seriously damaging to our future diplomatic prospects in Ghana. The Secretary's statement reflected a tight cold war

HELEN KITCHEN *is editor of the magazine* Africa Report.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

perspective that excludes the wider picture of African political dynamics. Inevitably, the new administration will worry about the increasing Soviet (and Chinese) relationships with African states, but it should not worry so publicly; for statements of the sort Mr. Herter made only feed the suspicion that America's only interest in Africa is to keep the Communists out.

It seems to me, also, that our expectancies for Africa should be redefined in terms of the West's largest aims. Reduced to essentials, it is *not* vital that the US have either bases or political alliances on the African continent. It is vital only that each African country and Africa as a whole, remain as purely African as possible; that the decision-making power remain in African hands, so that these new nations may develop economic and political bases capable of sustaining and gratifying popular expectancies.

This will obviously require more economic and technical assistance, for otherwise the approaching end of colonial rule in Africa raises the possibility that this continent will be farther away from what Rostow calls the "take off" stage of development a decade hence than it is now. Though nationalists tend to discount the economic contributions made by the colonial powers, it is an established fact that France, for example, has put an estimated $250 million a year into its territories of West and Equatorial Africa during the past 15 years. Britain's Colonial Welfare and Development Fund has put $70 million into Africa annually, and Belgian investment, not counting the reinvestment of profits earned in the Congo, was around $50 million a year. It is unlikely that retiring colonial powers are going to be willing to continue to pour money at this rate into countries whose leaders cannot henceforth afford politically, even if they were so inclined, to reciprocate with binding promises of long-term economic cooperation. These facts point up the pressing necessity of the US government taking an expert look at its pattern of aid to Africa, not just for next year, but over the next 10 years: the gap to be filled is enormous, and we had better decide fairly promptly what we are capable of doing about it. In theory, African leaders would prefer multilateral assistance to aid from either the Bloc or the West – but there is also a growing suspicion, which our government has fed by recent actions, that the volume of our aid to Africa is closely affected by the cold war considerations. "Panic aid" does not win long-term friends in Africa, and it makes many enemies, but it will take some convincing to persuade Africans – not to mention Congress – that our concern goes beyond the cold war. Aid, in any case, should definitely preclude playing one intra-African power group against another. While the US will, by the nature of things, be especially interested in the prospering of such key moderate regimes as those of Tunisia and Tanganyika, it would be self-defeating to shower these governments with such inordinate or unsubtle attention that Mr. Bourghiba or Mr. Nyerere become branded as American stooges and lose their credibility as authentic African nationalists. The US should not close the door to assistance for *any* regime which clearly represents the popular will, even when it seems temporarily to favor ties with the USSR or China. By closing these doors, we automatically increase the strangleholds of the bloc on that economy and reduce the government's future possibility for freedom of action.

Africa's ability to weather the next decade without succumbing to Communist pressures rests very heavily on the new states' ability to create a common consensus and a common sense of responsibility. There are potentially serious tensions among the African states – particularly between the radicals and the conservatives and between the French-speaking and English-speaking cultural segments – but it would be short-sighted indeed for the US to endeavor to deepen these cleavages by throwing our weight behind the more conservative states. Africa's only hope – the West's only hope – in this decade for a stable, non-Communist future is for the Africans to work things out their way. Our efforts should thus be directed toward making the continent as a whole strong, not playing one faction off against another. King-making, in the Middle and Far East, has proved unproductive and should not be repeated.

Many of the African leaders, we must also recognize, operate on a pendulum philosophy – moving far out in one direction, then overcompensating in the other, often coming back to a position somewhat left of center but basically moderate. The Kennedy administration's task will be to facilitate the swing back to center, but not to panic when the pendulum seems to be swinging at any given moment in time too far. Taking a page from Britain's experience in post-Nuri Iraq, we can do our long-term national interest most service by sitting out the twists of African politics and not honking the warning horn whenever the steering veers left. Our suasion, and African respect for our integrity, will emerge strengthened from a steadily dispassionate relationship that understands their need to act independently, because it will persuade them that our concern – when we do express it – is with *Africa's* problem and not solely with Africa's relationship to Moscow.

The panic reaction to Cuba's Fidel Castro by Washington has been a serious blight on US relations with Africa. Perhaps no single figure at the recent UN General Assembly in New York so captivated Africans as the ebullient Cuban, who appeared much more logical to them than he does to us. Having heard "Communist" so frequently and inaccurately applied to their own drives for independence, and lacking access to convincing intelligence regarding Communist activity in Cuba,

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Africans take with a grain of salt the self-righteous disdain of American leaders (of both parties) for the Castro regime. They see here a clear identification of the US with the "colonialist" mentality.

All that I have been suggesting here comes under the heading of "attitude." And "attitude" is conveyed by individual emissaries. Because of the acute racial problems involved as well as the rapid changes under way in Africa, much depends on the new administration's selection of appropriate personnel to man African diplomatic posts and the political desks and higher posts in Washington. The choice of Governor Williams is a promising beginning. It is especially encouraging to learn that he is to convene a roundtable of non-partisan, pragmatic academicians from the various African Studies Programs in American universities and US private foundations operating in Africa to obtain their collective analysis of the weakest points in our missions abroad, as observed during their frequent trips to the African continent and their close and trustful relationships with African political leaders. A great deal of work has already been done in this field by these independent operators, and much of it is highly relevant to any reassessment of policy.

Although there are in our Foreign Service some highly-skilled diplomats sensitive to the peculiar demands of Africa, a thorough housecleaning is badly needed to clear out those officers who look down their noses at Africans, seeing them from a Western European perspective and resenting being "sentenced" to this area. In one key African capital, we had until recently an Ambassador whose relationship with the Chief of State was so poor that they met only a few times a year, on ceremonial occasions; other officers in the Embassy were discouraged from developing personal relationships with African officials; this, moreover, in a country where the head of state was educated in the US and has previously dealt with Americans on a warm, personal basis. Another example of missed opportunity may be seen in the high level line officer who extols the virtues of life for an American stationed in one of the repressed Portuguese territories, without noticing the raised African eyebrows. From the President on down, a little genuine warmth and hospitality may go farther with Africans than a new aid program. And it is here especially that Governor Williams' talents may be most beneficial.

Given the youth of so many of the African leaders, it may be useful to dip more deeply into the eager group of younger officers in our Foreign Service to staff US embassies. Among this younger element, there is a high percentage of largely untried, but also untired, officers who regard Africa as their own "new frontier" and are curiously lacking in the racial preconceptions which handicap so many of the older generation. And in this connection, it should be pointed out that nowhere else in the world is it as important to assess both wives and husbands in selecting appointees.

What of recruiting more Negro officers at the Ambassadorial and staff level in our Embassies in Africa? It would please American Negroes, but if we are to be candid, it must be said that such appointments are of doubtful value, until and unless Negroes also become more widely appointed to US diplomatic missions in white countries. Too often, Negroes assigned to Africa have been chosen *because* of their color, not because they were specifically qualified. Africans are deeply concerned about the struggle of American Negroes for social and economic equality, but they have ambivalent feelings about having "second class citizens" assigned to them alone.

It is, one may note, an important advantage for Governor Williams that he is trusted by the American Negro community and will be ideally suited to seek its assistance in finding expertise among the growing corps of Negro Africanists in this country.

Finally, one of the new Assistant Secretary of State's most urgent tasks is the creation of a unit within the Bureau of African Affairs that will deal with the acute human problems of African diplomats living in Washington's (and New York's) semi-segregated society. This would not necessarily be expensive, but it must be staffed by dedicated souls who are willing to work on a round-the-clock basis to ease the economic and social difficulties which dark-skinned diplomats encounter (and sometimes try to keep secret) in trying to find suitable housing and schools for their families. At least one member of this staff should be thoroughly familiar with the real estate market and vocabulary, in order to enlist the patriotic cooperation of local real estate organizations. Too many newly-independent countries are being forced to buy outrageously over-priced properties in order to circumvent the color bar. The possibility of enlisting the assistance of private foundations in helping some of the poorer countries finance suitable property ought to be fully explored. Foreign Service wives, under Departmental auspices, should be encouraged to devote more attention to helping wives of African diplomats learn about American society and institutions and home life – a task that has usually been left largely to the Negro community of the nation's capital.

In traditional political terms, it may appear that Governor Williams has not received all that is his due in reward for past loyalties. It is perhaps a measure of the man that he recognizes that this particular Assistant Secretaryship is one of the most challenging assignments of the Kennedy administration, and that he is willing to take the enormous risk of failure as well.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Right and Ruthless

It is already obvious that there is going to be no honeymoon period for the Kennedy administration. Ranging shots are falling all around it now, and the massed batteries will let go before the new President steps down from the platform after delivering his inaugural address on January 20.

This no doubt is vexatious to Mr. Kennedy and those around him, but it may be plausibly argued that in the long run it will be salutary. After all, political honeymoons are notoriously fraudulent. They are based, as regards the winning side, on the fair hope of patronage, and used by the losers as an interval in which to stockpile missiles for use as soon as the honeymoon is over.

This is a bitterness apparently exceeding even that of the defeated Hoover regime; and the Hoover people were the worst losers since John Adams skipped out of Washington before dawn rather than see his successful rival installed in office. The reason is not far to seek. The event of November 8 was not merely a defeat, it was a humiliation. Mr. Eisenhower himself, at least in the early days, chose to regard the vote as a repudiation of his political philosophy and in some sense of his labors. He was in error. A leader who has never been accepted cannot be repudiated. Mr. Eisenhower's distress is due to his being compelled to face the fact that what his chosen mentors have been feeding him was not political wisdom, but chemically pure hooey, and he didn't know it. That discovery stings worse than defeat at the polls.

And his followers, or a considerable proportion of them, are in a position almost as uncomfortable. They can no longer conceal even from themselves that for at least six of the past eight years they have been, not the architects of a new political order, but mere coattail riders. They have held the executive branch, not by their own strength, but by their ability to turn to their uses the infinite and invincible sentimentality of the American people. The winner was not the Republican party, but Eisenhower's five stars.

Without that talisman they could not win even though the opposition was not merely split, but quartered, first by the civil rights issue, and again by religious prejudice. The Rockefeller splinter perhaps has escaped humiliation and the blind fury it engenders, but it is a splinter and certainly will not set the tone of the Republican opposition in the near future.

Thus it seems likely that Mr. Kennedy will face not only the normal dislike of the defeated party, but the far more bitter resentment of men who know at heart that they have only themselves to blame for their present low estate. To expect temperate and fair-minded opposition from such men is to expect more than human nature can give. In the memorable words of Ironpants, the redoubtable Hugh Johnson, soon the air will be filled with dead cats. Already they are accusing the Democrats of stealing the election; so Kennedy is branded as a receiver of stolen goods two months before taking the oath of office; and if he thinks that being called a fence is rough, let him just wait, for it will be a compliment by comparison with what they will be calling him two months after the inauguration.

He cannot prevent this assault, and if it comes swiftly he will the sooner realize that amiable goodfellowship will get him nothing the next four years, and therefore will waste little time trying to placate the implacable. Yet while he cannot prevent the assault he can do something to moderate it by making it somewhat dangerous. The second Roosevelt, as all the world knows, was a man of great personal charm; but what few outsiders, but every politician in Washington knew, is that he was an exceedingly bad man to monkey with, and none tried it twice.

Kennedy also has a personal charm that is sometimes compared to Roosevelt's. Some of his intimates assert that he has as well a comparable ruthlessness. He will need it, for it is an era of the ruthless, which the tenderhearted deplore without sufficient reason, for it is possible for a man to be right as well as ruthless. If Kennedy is in fact both, it is impossible to set limits to what he may achieve. But he will get nowhere by charm alone, or by logic alone. He must also pack a wallop in either fist, for he may be as right as Cassandra and yet, by wavering, go down to defeat. His possession of this quality remains to be demonstrated; but if they start throwing punches at him instantly we shall soon know. Then prediction of the future of the new administration will become something more than guess-work.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Herbert J. Stern

Politics of the Mind

Not two but three parties compete for mastery. None stays long in office. All are reconciled to a kind of uneasy but satisfactory coexistence.

The government of my mind, I discover, is shared not very harmoniously by three rival parties, all of them in a sense un-American, in that they take control through insurrection rather than election. The major party – and here again my mind's politics differs, if only slightly, from my country's – is conservative, even reactionary. Its terms in office are longest and most frequent because its policies are the most comfortable. Its mottos are, alternately, "Don't rock the boat" and "You never had it so good."

The minority party is progressive, even to a degree radical. Both its domestic and foreign policies are built on the assumption that change is necessary, and that some changes, because they work against conditions rooted so deeply in myself or in the world, can take place only by violent deracination. The motto of my second party is borrowed from Rilke: "You must change your life."

Things would go smoothly enough, I believe, if I had only a two-party system to contend with. Unfortunately there is a third party which is really no party at all – it disapproves of both action and reaction. It has no motto, appropriately, because its exclusive preoccupations are, in foreign affairs, nothingness, and in domestic, the Vanity of Human Wishes. It would be safe to call them Disaffiliates. If my mind held elections, they would not vote.

But politics, after all, is a practical affair, and I have been talking mostly about principles. Let us, then – to pay a parting compliment to a phrase which, God willing, we will not hear again for another four years – look at the record. The conservative party of my mind is tough-mindedly optimistic. When its State Department provides it with potentially unsettling news from Algeria or the Congo or Cuba or, for that matter, from New Orleans, it issues edicts based on the sound historical principle that the world has had troubles before which either have been solved or which went away, and that current troubles, too, will be solved, or go away, if we only play it cool. When scientific advisers suggest to it that the bombs we exploded yesterday or shall perhaps explode tomorrow may reach out in time to blight or destroy my unborn grandchildren, the conservative party of my mind replies, in tones of unshakeable confidence: "Take therefore no thought for the morrow, for the morrow shall take thought for the things of itself."

The ability of the conservative party to maintain a degree of complacency in the face of such adversities as these is founded partly on its faith that as long as one works hard and remains as virtuous as is comfortably possible, progress will more or less inevitably ensue; really more basic than this faith, however, is its fundamentally isolationist policy. Although the conservative party believes, with Dr. Pangloss, that this is the best of all possible worlds, it also believes, with Candide himself, that our best course is to cultivate our gardens.

In short, it is far less interested in Cuba than in Wabash College, Crawfordsville, Indiana, where I happen to teach, and, particularly, in 410 Crawford Street, Crawfordsville, where I happen to live. Thus, it finds it reassuring that, although segregation may be a problem in New Orleans, Louisiana, it is certainly not a problem in Crawfordsville; or at least, if it *is* a problem in Crawfordsville, it is not a problem in the little world of Wabash College.

It likes the title – although I didn't see the movie – of the recent Peter Sellers comedy, *I'm All Right, Jack*. It *is* all right; well-educated, well-fed, well-housed, well-familied, well-paid, it has remarkably little to bitch about.

If the conservatives tend to be rather easy-going, the radical party, unfortunately, tends to be cranky; perhaps it would be better to say intolerant, for it finds a good many things intolerable. Unlike the conservatives, it has a remarkably efficient intelligence operation, for though it really doesn't *do* much about the world, it is acutely aware of what ought to be done.

But to return to the question of intolerance: the radical party, as I have suggested, is very much aware of others. It doesn't care whether 17 or 17 million Americans go to bed hungry; it does know that a good many, too many people, at home and abroad, go to bed hungry and even at times, hungry, do not wake up. This knowledge it finds intolerable. It is aware that segregation is not a problem of local interest only for those who live

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

in New Orleans, Louisiana, but that it may also be of some concern, even local concern, to those who live in Crawfordsville, Indiana; or, for that matter, even to those of us who live in shuttered white houses on Crawford Street and do nothing about it.

When the conservatives release their State of the Nation addresses, the argument is usually an embroidery around the basic theme: Herbert Stern's a pretty good guy. The radicals, I'm afraid, are likely to snicker quietly at this. The conservatives are remarkably easy to live with, the radicals are not. The former may observe, "That was a pretty good class"; the latter say, "It stank." The former remark, "That's a witty letter you just wrote"; the latter ask, "Why aren't you writing articles?" Nothing I do, in short, is enough to please the radicals, and because they are generally out of office, and because they are rarely heeded, their criticism tends to grow progressively spirited and, of course, progressively negative.

The occasional news releases of the disaffiliated part of my mind are usually to this effect: "Why don't you chuck the whole business?" And because it issues such releases only in the relatively rare moments when it is in power, its suggestions momentarily have considerable influence. In some ways, this influence is similar to that of the radical faction, with the important difference that the Disaffiliates neither expect anything to change nor believe that it would make very much difference if it did. It restores me to slumber not with the simple injunction "Don't rock the boat," but with the jazzier rhythms of Louis MacNeice:

> It's no go the picture palace, it's no go the stadium,
> It's no go the country cot with a pot of pink geraniums.
> It's no go the Government grants, it's no go the elections,
> Sit on your arse for fifty years and hang your hat on a pension.
> It's no go my honey love, it's no go my poppet;
> Work your hands from day to day, the winds will blow the profit.
> The glass is falling hour by hour, the glass will fall for ever,
> But if you break the bloody glass you won't hold up the answer.

I think, however, that in the privacy of its state chamber – although never in public – it would be willing to go so far toward affirmation as Camus, who says, "Living is keeping the absurd alive" – which is perhaps not very far.

In those rare moments when I can stand outside the government of my mind – as I do here – and observe its operations, I find myself saying what Winston Churchill said about democracy: "It is the worst form of government save for all the others." The key to its success is the balance of power, of which none of the parties wholly approves, yet which none, I expect, would gladly see destroyed. Although whichever party is in office inevitably attempts to carry out its own policies and to ignore those of its rivals, it is nevertheless aware, however reluctantly, that those alternate policies exist. It is in that awareness, I believe, that the river of intellect and personality has its source.

But in an "age of hard trying" like our own, my argument may not yet seem convincing, for most of us find it more reassuring to believe that we, like things outside ourselves, should be capable of explanation by single principles. Let me explain, then, why I think it is fortunate that this is not so. Each of my parties has a certain strength, if only the strength of its partial comprehension of the truth; and each, too, has its weaknesses, which can learn correction only from without. The strength of the conservative faction is in its firmness and its stability; its weakness is in its complacency, a state which is close to sleep and to death. I confess that I am far more sympathetic with the radical element, but it too, I am afraid, has weaknesses sometimes hard to distinguish from its strength. That strength is savage indignation, the impatience to bear what should not be borne, the irritable passion for perfection in a world which, perhaps properly, insists that change requires patience and time. Although it is the radical element with which I am most in sympathy, I cannot honestly argue that I would want it to be in unchallenged control. Unchecked, the very emotion on which it thrives may move from impatience to rage to madness, for, after all, a good deal of what is not to be borne must be borne, nevertheless.

Finally, it may seem surprising that I find, even in that part of myself that is disaffiliated, something worthy of approval, as well as of blame. It is true, of course, that left to itself my third party leads me to that sloth which the medieval theologians wisely considered one of the seven deadly sins. For if, as is possible, all that I hold valuable were to prove, in eternity's long run, to be worthless, and all I hold to be true, false, then there would be little point to action. Or, unfortunately, even to reaction; alone, if my present values were lost, I'm afraid that I'd have little inclination to turn to others. But for all that, it is the voice of the Disaffiliates that reminds me on occasion of those universal negations and doubts which, from time to time, have produced such objects of high art as *Oedipus Rex*, *Hamlet*, and *Crime and Punishment;* and, coming closer to ourselves, with which it is the privilege and the obligation of the living mind perpetually to wrestle.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Mural Words and Moral Theories

by Richard Sparks

Is there anyone who does not know the history of D. H. Lawrence's last novel, from its initial publication in Italy in 1928 to the present day? When Penguin Books, Britain's oldest and largest paperback publishers, decided to publish an unexpurgated version of *Lady Chatterley's Lover* (influenced by the passage last year of a new and more liberal Obscene Publications Act and perhaps by the appearance of the Grove Press edition in the US) they informed the Director of Public Prosecutions of their intentions, and announced that they would not publish the book at all unless they could publish it in uncensored form. In the trial that has just ended to establish this right, Mervyn Griffith-Jones QC led for the Director of Public Prosecutions; Penguin was represented by Gerald Gardiner QC, one of Britain's top barristers.

The Obscene Publications Act of 1959 has two important provisions which make it, at least nominally, an improvement over its predecessor. First, a book is to be judged in its entirety, and cannot be damned as lewd on the basis of passages taken out of context. Second, the Act provides that expert witnesses can be called by either side to give evidence as to the book's artistic, literary or other merits. Even a book found to be obscene may be published if these merits outweigh its obscenity. This is a far cry from the trial of Radcliffe Hall's *The Well of Loneliness* in 1928, when a larger volume of writers and critics (including E. M. Forster, who testified for *Lady Chatterley's Lover*) were not allowed to take the stand.

The prosecution's case against the book turned on two main points. The first was that it contains a fair number of what Vladimir Nabokov once called "mural words" – nouns and verbs supposedly of Anglo-Saxon origin, the very sight of which tend to deprave and corrupt beyond redemption any reader save prosecuting counsel. Mr. Griffith-Jones had carefully counted up the number of these words in the book and, despite the Act's provision that passages should not be cited out of context, he did this time and time again.

It was observed by several who listened to these recitations that they went a long way toward showing that the words and paragraphs themselves were not obscene, but that a deliberately lascivious reading by Mr. Griffith-Jones, in the dismal setting of the Old Bailey, could easily make them so. His attacks also had a curious smell of old-fashioned class snobbery about them, *viz:* "Would you want your servants to read this book?" and "What of its effects on girls working in a factory?"

The second part of the prosecution's case was, roughly, that the theme of *Lady Chatterley* was immoral, and that therefore it was obscene. This involved the assumption that adultery is always a Bad Thing (though it is not a crime in Britain, as it is in several American states). This nonsensical claim – that a book about an immoral theme was, *q.e.d.*, an immoral book – was not pressed to its logical conclusion by either side; and not one witness was called by the prosecution to testify on the book's literary or other merits.

Never mind; the defense made up for Mr. Griffith-Jones' sin of omission in this respect by summoning 35 witnesses to the character of Lady Chatterley and her creator. They included the Bishop of Woolwich and a couple of other clergymen, one of whom has a television program; writers like Mr. Forster, C. Day Lewis, Walter Allen, Stephen (*Gamemanship*) Potter and Dame Rebecca West; scholars of literature, notably Miss Helen Gardner of Oxford; professor-writers like Richard Hoggart and Raymond Williams; Roy Jenkins MP, a sponsor of the Act; the editor of *The Manchester Guardian;* miscellaneous literary types like Norman St. John Stevas, who helped draft the Act; and various journalists and teachers. (During the trial a *Daily Mail* cartoon defined a "failed writer" as "one who wasn't asked to testify.") The final witness on the book's merits was Miss Bernardine Wall, a 21-year-old Cambridge graduate who had also attended a convent school. Miss Wall told the Court that she had read a censored version of *Lady Chatterley's Lover* when she was 17 and found it lacking in merit; and had read the whole book later and found it better; she was prevented by the Court from saying where she had first learned the mural words. After she had finished delivering this piece of literary expertise Mr. Gardiner announced modestly that he had another 36 witnesses in reserve, but said he did not feel that he needed to call them.

If the variety of this group seems incredible, its testimony was more so. Lawrence was called "one of the greatest novelists in English in any century" and a genius; *Lady Chatterley's Lover* was described as a "study in human tenderness," an "allegory," "an extremely pure book," "a sociological document of great importance," and "educational." It was hailed as a great novel, a brilliant novel, a moral tract, required reading for every Christian, for Roman Catholic priests, for everyone.

Herein may lie a potential danger of the Act, whatever its other merits. It was ruled that the "literary, artistic, scientific or other" merits mentioned in the Act could include ethical merits. Even if a book is obscene, *i.e.*, can deprave or corrupt those likely to read it, it can still be published if it is in the public good – which would seem to imply that depravity and corruption can be in the public good. But it is the very phrase "public good" that is suspect. For it was implicit in the testimony of too many of the witnesses that the book had a great literary merit *because* it had a moral message. The Bishop of Woolwich said that he would not wish primarily to argue for the book on its ethical

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

merits; he then testified that the book had a "positive value from the ethical point of view." It was implied at times that if Lawrence's book had not had a morally or socially positive message, it would have had no merit. (But conversely, that to leave out certain passages would spoil the book *aesthetically*.) This kind of definition of aesthetic worth in terms of moral or social content is not only confusing; it is getting perilously close to the criticisms of *Dr. Zhivago* made by Communist intellectuals. One may agree or disagree with "experts' " views on morality and adultery, or with their hyperbolic praise of the book; but to link up the two is surely a mistake.

I mention this because if there is a persistent fault of British criticism of the arts today, it is this very tendency to demand that artists exemplify some kind of social ideals in their work – namely, the kind of ideals that the critic feels are "positive." One must be "committed." Plato, who realized the essentially subversive nature of poets, would have banished them from his Republic; there seems a depressing possibility that Lawrence's book was found to be not obscene because the ideas he expounded in it are *not* particularly subversive to a handful of "experts" in contemporary Britain.

Anyway, mural words and moral theories had their day. Then Mr. Justice Byrne gave his summing-up. He was careful to tell the jury that no matter what the "experts" said about Connie Chatterley, it was for them to decide on their own whether the book should be published – which raises considerable doubt whether expert witnesses can ever advise juries on what are patently matters of fact, and makes one wonder why on earth the witnesses were called at all. To top it all off, the jury were told that they must decide (1) whether the book was obscene, and (2) whether, even if it was obscene, it had merits which justified publication. The nine men and three women pondered these two questions for three hours and returned with a simple verdict of "Not Guilty" – which means that we may never know whether *Lady Chatterley's Lover* is officially obscene or not.

There have been some strange reactions to the verdict. Most of the egghead press approved it as a triumph for Art, Literature, Freedom of Speech, British Common Sense, Gerald Gardiner and D. H. Lawrence. Most of the comment in the popular press was sensible and restrained. The *Times* ascended to Olympian heights formerly occupied only by Richard M. Nixon in a windy leading article which dissented from the verdict "on the grounds of decency, of taste, even of morals," and pleaded for "a decent reticence" in such matters. The *Times* subsequently printed three pages of letters from its readers, most of whom agreed that the verdict was a shame; there has been so much religion in the air – *a propos* of this pagan's book – that one might well mistake Britain for the United States. Fourteen MP's sought to repeal the Obscene Publications Act, "which has had such unfortunate consequences." The Swansea Public Libraries Committee announced that it would lend the book only if specially requested to, "that woman library assistants may refuse to handle it and young girl assistants will not be allowed to." The Archbishop of Canterbury publicly rebuked the Bishop of Woolwich for his testimony.

At a more practical level, Penguin Books – whose trial costs were almost £10,000 – announced that the first printing of 200,000 copies had been sold out within hours, and that 300,000 more copies were being prepared. It is speculated that *Lady Chatterley's Lover* may become an all-time British best-seller, breaking the present record of a million copies which is held by a wartime book on aircraft recognition.

Alas, the more idiotic examples of British censorship seem likely to remain, as long as the national temper remains what it is. A book like Stanley Kauffmann's *The Philanderer*, prosecuted here in 1954, might well not have passed under this Act. Jean Genet's collected works cannot be legally imported here *even in French*. There is a fair amount of easily identifiable pornography sold in the seedy environs of the Charing Cross Road, but the *Lady Chatterly* case does not seem likely to make it easier to deal with this. "Borderline" cases – books by writers with no friends among the "experts" – are still labeled as smut; who can imagine the Bishop of Woolwich testifying for Genet or Henry Miller?

The *Chatterley* judgment itself was unexceptional, and as a precedent it is doubtful. There was no outstanding liberal statement like US Judge Van Pelt Bryan's, that obscenity was not to depend on the effect of the book on "the irresponsible, the immature or the sensually minded"; no equal of Judge Woolsey's classic pronouncement that *Ulysses* was "emetic, but nowhere . . . aphrodisiac." It is generally agreed that the Director of Public Prosecutions erred badly in bringing the case, and worse in not calling witnesses for his side; the probability is that no witness could be found who could honestly say that the book ought to be banned even if it was not great literature. All in all, it is difficult to resist the conclusion that the best thing about the trial may be that nothing like it may happen again.

Aged Women

Time vacates, leaving nothing theirs but time,
time on a corner, totally unplanned,
current as echoes. On the walks they stand,
still members of the moving pantomime.
Here is the world of their confusion. Here,
having betrayed an early confidence,
this world prepares to leave them.
In defense
they shamble toward a straitened thoroughfare
where they exact attention from us, where
slowly they count their change despite our frowns,
for valued is the space they occupy
and clerks explain all questions that appear.
The world allows them in this settling down
to measure moments with a steady eye.

Knute Skinner

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

A Matter of Style

by Herbert von Borch

In a succession of important books over the past decade, Walt Whitman Rostow, Professor of Economic History at MIT and now slated, one learns, for a central foreign policy assignment in the Kennedy Administration, has shown a growing intellectual audacity. His first efforts were relatively circumscribed studies of particular societies (notably *The Prospects for Communist China* and *Dynamics of Soviet Society*). Earlier this year he offered a more panoramic "Non-Communist Manifesto" (*The Stages of Economic Growth*). Now he has sought nothing less than to apply all of his accumulated insights to a quite concrete analysis of the US record in world affairs from 1940 to 1958 and of the roots of the national performance in American domestic life past and present.

The United States in the World Arena
by W. W. Rostow
(Harper; $8.75)

The effort is a brilliant success. It skillfully combines discussion of the substance of policy and of the policy-making process itself. Why, Rostow asks, has the American Executive so often proved sluggish, slow, even helpless in the face of great crisis? Why has it acted so often in world affairs under the pressure of events rather than before? His answer lies in an intricate and somewhat sociological analysis of the distinctive American "national style."

What the US has lacked is the capacity for radical innovation, which is to say, in the case of any society, the capacity "to avoid going down to defeat or decay in the style . . . to which it has become accustomed." As a prospering society, a "going concern," the United States in its 19th-Century formative period was spared rigorous intellectual introspection. Thus the nation "built its style around the task of solving problems . . . by sensing recurrent patterns rather than by isolating clear-cut, logical connections of cause and effect." This worked well enough for, let us say, industrial growth or the accommodations of internal politics – where the problems confronted were relatively familiar and time permitted "the osmotic process of accepting change." But foreign policy was something else again. Here the national style meant only a series of disorderly *ad hoc* responses which represented, in each case, a frantic attempt to bridge the gap between the ideal "American" standard and the compromise dictated by global *realpolitik*:

> "From Hay's Open Door notes at the turn of the century through Wilson's performance at Versailles, Hoover's isolationism, and Franklin Roosevelt's and Stimson's conception of *noblesse oblige* as an instrument for taming Stalin, to the Eisenhower Administration's mixture of moralism and obsessive concentration on the building of military pacts for more than a half-century now, various strands in the classic national style, representing one dimension or another of the nation's private habits and experience, yielded results which failed adequately to protect the national interest. The environment which the nation faced and the problems it raised for solutions were systematically misunderstood when viewed parochially from the setting of American life."

The cold war, Rostow suggests as a central case in point, could have been avoided – if the US had sought systematically to build a power position which would have rendered Big Three unity the more attractive alternative for Moscow. That is to say, if the Western powers had consciously sought to end the war "with Soviet troops as far east as possible" rather than, as actually happened, letting matters drift "so as to give Moscow the possibility of dominating the whole region from the Soviet border to the Elbe"; if the West, in short, had been determined on holding all of Germany and securing a European settlement "in which the Soviet Union was forced to bargain away the possibilities of unilateral power to achieve a basis for long-run Russian security in collaboration with the Western powers."

One key phrase should be underlined in this sentence: *to bargain*. For it has simply not been the American national style to approach diplomacy as a contest of power to be resolved by hard bargaining. American thought at the time the war ended was preoccupied with an ideal conception – the organization of a world structure for permanent peace – which was an extension on the world level of the domestic ideals of freedom and equality central to American domestic society. Since it was more or less assumed that a power struggle between the West and the Soviet Union could be avoided, the US felt free to focus its attention on the grand design of world peace without bothering about the details of territorial power. "Poland was the area for the showdown," but the showdown never came, and "even those in Washington who wisely warned of the dangers of German and European schism" did not sense fully what was at stake.

The European governments, on the other hand, with their centuries-old legacy of power conflicts, each had their separate interests quite clearly in mind. "There was no equivalent in American thought," writes Rostow, "to this lively awareness that wartime performance would inevitably affect national interests and postwar status whatever formal structure the peace assumed. There was nothing in the American concept of the postwar as concrete as the Soviet aim to maximize its power in Eastern and Central Europe, the desire in China to defeat an opposing political faction, the British purpose to restore the Empire and to hold its own in alliance with the United States as a major power on the world scene."

One might observe in passing that a more acute sense of power realities might have made a big difference in the course of US relations with the Soviet Union as late as 1952 or 1953. Stalin's note of March 10, 1952, proposing German reunification on the basis of free elections, signified a very real Russian anxiety at the prospect of an armed Germany and possible Russian willingness, at that time, to pay something of a price to keep West Germany out of military alliance with the West. Whatever the seriousness of the offer, the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

by Osborn

THE VULGARIANS

"An impressive, impassioned book, and a service to man and to art."
– WILLIAM COLE in *The New Republic*

List price **$3.95**

In a few weeks since publication, **THE VULGARIANS**, by Robert Osborn, has become a classic of its kind.

Because this is a remarkable satire and the essence of Mr. Osborn's art, **The New Republic** arranged with The New York Graphic Society to offer the book to this journal's subscribers at a special discount.

Single copies may be purchased for $3, two for $5.50, three for $8.

All books sent postpaid, gift cards included if received with your order. Send your check or money order to:

THE NEW REPUBLIC
1244 - 19th Street, N.W.
Washington 6, D. C.

fact remains that it was repeated several times up to the last days preceding the treaties formally integrating Bonn with the alliance in the spring of 1955.

The real turning point was probably 1953. It may be doubted whether, after the Soviets exploded their own H-bomb, they were afraid enough of the German-US combination that they would ever have felt compelled to pay any real price for reunification. Nevertheless, one is inspired by Rostow's analysis to wonder what results a different US national style would have produced in 1952 and 1953.

But these were, to be sure, the years of changeover from Truman to the Eisenhower Presidency. And it is the Eisenhower performance which in Rostow's analysis shows to a classic degree the US incapacity for radical innovation. As the author argues in detail, citing the protracted crisis period from Suez and Sputnik to the Iraq coup and the Lebanon landings in 1958, the Eisenhower style was inappropriate to a phase in the nation's history when flexible adjustment to a fast-changing environment was required. It is interesting to note that Rostow thinks Eisenhower's "instinctive direction" was different from that taken by his Administration. But that is past history. What can and must be done now, and this really is the focus of his "Essay in Recent History," to make the national style more capable of radical innovation?

Before the author arrives at certain "predictions and prescriptions," he clarifies the nature of the world in which America must now act. Three basic forces – the technological revolution in communications, the revolution in weapons and the revolutionary movement toward modernization in the economically less-developed continents – are creating an "enlarging world arena" in which "the centers of power will increase in numbers." This, of course, affects Moscow as well as Washington. Rostow sees Communism facing a profound dilemma arising from a clash between the diffusion of power and the underlying nature of Communism itself. The concept of world domination is in doubt. "A world full of Titos represents nightmare for the Kremlin, not triumph." Rostow takes Russia's preoccupation with a re-emergence of Germany seriously; it is for Moscow "a major problem of both power and ideology." This corresponds to his earlier statement that the cold war would have been avoided if Stalin could have been persuaded to exchange Soviet withdrawal from Eastern Europe for the neutralization of all Germany. He says that, measured by the gauge of economic growth, the Soviet Union has attained maturity and could turn its economic machine to mass consumption, but that this pressure has "not been relieved by Soviet policy." On the other hand, Rostow believes that "should Soviet society move on to the form of mobile metropolitan life typical of the United States . . . the balance between freedom and the certainty of control would be altered in ways which . . . would move Soviet society away from the patterns and texture of the Communist past." If this constitutes a challenge for the West, as it certainly does, what might be the response?

Now we come to the heart of the matter: the US response should be what Rostow calls a "great act of persuasion. . . . Its objective would be to persuade those who may be responsible for Soviet policy that the only realistic alternative left open to them by the course of history in Russia and by the emerging contours of the world outside is to accept status as a major responsible state in a multipolar world." Rostow knows that this would mean a drastic change for the Russians; but he believes also that this act of persuasion is not impossible and would produce "a global arena of power within which the threat of war had been radically reduced, if not fully eliminated."

He goes on to propose that in the "next creative phase of military and foreign policy," which would lead to a revived policy of Free World partnership, the US should:

1. Continue to convince the Communist leadership that wars, even minor wars, would be irrational;
2. Make ample economic resources available to the less-developed countries so that they may move ahead without recourse to totalitarian methods;
3. Rebuild the alliance with Western Europe and Japan by exploiting the diffusion of power;
4. Keep up a running dialogue with the Russians, never losing the initiative.

He sees an obstacle in the National Security Council and the Joint Chiefs

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of Staff as "essentially committees of operators" – "biased heavily toward the status quo as indeed operators must be." The antidote? "In Washington a change of spirit is required. The individual human beings in the great bureaucracies must be encouraged to think, to throw out new ideas, to debate openly. The illusion that the nation's affairs can successfully be handled by negotiating minimum consensus in layer after layer of interdepartmental committees must be broken."

The author runs tandem with his colleague, John Kenneth Galbraith, in his conviction that adequate allocations for public purposes must be made, even at the sacrifice of a degree of private consumption, although he disagrees with Galbraith in the matter of full employment which he considers indispensable. Moreover, Galbraith places the accent on America as an "affluent society"; Rostow sees it as a "tight continental community living in conditions of protracted danger."

Strength, will and imagination are needed to confront the danger and to implement the agenda this book offers. It is a large order.

MOVIES

Foreign Languages in Foreign Pictures

The report of Roberto Rossellini's artistic death has been at least partially exaggerated. His latest film *General della Rovere* does not stand with *Open City* and *Paisan*, but it is a creditable work, touched with beauty. In it Rossellini is both helped and obsessed by his ability to create atmosphere, and he is finally denied the tragic heights at which he aimed by the cleverness of as the general – rather than inform.

General della Rovere (Continental)
The Big Deal on Madonna Street (UMPO)

his story; but Vittorio De Sica's fine performance gives much of the film poignancy.

It is Genoa, 1943, under the Badoglio government and the German occupation. De Sica is an engaging con man who lives off prostitutes and by a share of the bribes he passes on to Germans from Italians who want to help their imprisoned relatives. He is arrested, and a German colonel decides to use his talents. If De Sica will pose in prison as the secretly executed partisan General della Rovere, if he will thus ferret out the identity of the underground leader in that prison whom the general was to meet, the Germans will ship him to Switzerland. De Sica agrees; but the respect the "general" is accorded by his fellow-prisoners and their heroism have a purifying effect on him. He goes to the firing squad – still

Almost half of this long film could have been spared. The despair of the era and the con man's sordidness could have been concisely rendered. The drama really begins with his arrest. And there is a basic conflict between the O. Henry ingenuity of the plot and the hugeness of the theme: namely, man's willingness to give his life for an abstraction which he knows can never be completely realized, but which must be preserved as a goal. It is the gravest of subjects and demands the simplest confrontation possible. Nevertheless, slowly and within narrow limits, the picture generates power.

Hannes Messemer, the colonel, is for a change a German officer who does not secretly sympathize with democracy. De Sica not only makes his conversion utterly convincing, he makes the earlier villain understandable; and confirms his place as one of the best actors in films.

My enjoyment of these performances leads logically to a note of thanks to Richard Davis, head of United Motion Picture Organization, distributors of the Italian comedy *The Big Deal on Madonna Street*. At a recent screening of this film the first reel was run with sub-titles and was then run in a dubbed version with English dialogue. At this point a vote was taken as to how the audience would prefer to see the remainder. The vote, happily, was over-

Mr. & Mrs. Citizen

Your role in a program of action is defined in this NEW book

GOALS FOR AMERICANS

The Report of the President's Commission on National Goals

This non-partisan book throws into sharp perspective for you the vital issues of American life.

GOALS FOR AMERICANS contains the official report to the President of the United States from the Commission, as well as fifteen accompanying chapters prepared with the help of nearly 100 leading specialists.

Its message focuses on current problems, proposes specific courses of action, and shows what you, as an individual, can do to help achieve our objectives.

America is on the verge of a new decade. If you are concerned with the part that *you* can play in our growth, you will find GOALS FOR AMERICANS indispensable reading.

Cloth, $3.50, Spectrum Paperback, $1.00 at all bookstores

Members of the President's Commission on National Goals

HENRY M. WRISTON, *Chairman*
FRANK PACE, JR., *Vice-Chairman*
ERWIN D. CANHAM • JAMES B. CONANT
COLGATE W. DARDEN, JR.
CRAWFORD H. GREENEWALT
ALFRED M. GRUENTHER
LEARNED HAND (until Oct. 1)
CLARK KERR • JAMES R. KILLIAN, JR.
GEORGE MEANY

Administered by THE AMERICAN ASSEMBLY, Columbia University

PRENTICE-HALL, INC.
Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Finished *Enjoy, Enjoy!* ?

WHY WAIT A YEAR FOR HARRY GOLDEN'S NEXT BOOK?



Subscribe to *The Carolina Israelite* (now 53,089 subscriptions) . . . America's most widely read, and most widely quoted personal journal. For you: $3 year. For your friends: $3 year, *The Carolina Israelite*, 1312 Elizabeth Avenue, Charlotte, N. C.

whelmingly in favor of sub-titles. Because of this vote and because of reactions from patrons of the New York theater where it is playing, who made their views known before the opening, the picture was initially released in its sub-titled version.

First, let me say that this is a frequently funny, sometimes slapstick, sometimes subtle film about a bungling gang of Roman robbers – a sort of burlesque *Rififi* – with an accomplished cast including Marcello Mastroianni and Toto. The script is somewhat casual about tying up a couple of plot elements, but the picture is a pleasant evening's entertainment.

Second, and more important, Mr. Davis is to be congratulated on his resistance to the crusade led by Bosley Crowther of *The New York Times* to abolish sub-titles. Mr. Crowther and others would have all foreign-language films presented with English dialogue dubbed (post-recorded) on the soundtrack by actors other than the ones on screen. Those present at Mr. Davis's experiment were quick to recognize the difference between a whole and a schizoid work.

Mr. Crowther rightly cites the annoyance of printed words across the bottom of a screen, but any device that enables us to preserve a performance *whole is preferable to artistic bastardy.* The voice is an integral part of an actor's equipment – not just any voice – *that* actor's voice. Are we to be cheated of the voices of De Sica, Mastroianni, and numberless other actors? Must we settle for performances split down the middle and stitched together? Are we to lose, too, the color of a foreign language in a foreign picture? I don't know a word of Swedish, but it is impossible for me to think of Bergman's films in English; the *sound* of Swedish is part of their texture.

Mr. Crowther has, I take it, four further arguments.

1. Many scenes are now dubbed anyway.

It is true that some dialogue is recorded after the scene is filmed, but it is almost always done by the same actors and the performance is theirs.

2. American films are usually dubbed in foreign languages abroad.

Yes, and anyone who has heard, say, James Cagney dubbed in Italian feels sorry both for Cagney and Italian audiences who who have never heard him – and certainly doesn't want the error perpetrated in reverse.

3. Dubbing allows a fuller translation, instead of synoptic sub-titles.

Experience with dubbing (I happen to have had a little) quickly reveals how difficult it is to match adequate translations to lip movements, precisely or even approximately. A short clear *précis* at the bottom of the screen can be much more easily controlled. Sometimes sub-titling is inadequately done; it *can* be done well as in *Hiroshima, Mon Amour.*

4. More people will go to dubbed than to sub-titled pictures.

This is a confusion of sociological-economic reasons with artistic ones. More people will go to see Elvis Presley than *Ikiru;* why should *Ikiru* be diminished in order to compete for part of Elvis's audience? Mr. Crowther seems bemused by the notion that the number of people who see a work is the paramount criterion, whether or not the work is debased to attract them. This is an admirably democratic impulse but it is not necessarily a sound artistic standard at all.

Economically, it is patent that the showing of sub-titled films is profitable or it would long ago have ceased.

Sub-titling is the lesser of two lamenesses, but it certainly is the lesser. I shiver when I think that Mr. Crowther's great influence may frighten distributors into dubbing all foreign pictures, thus mocking the actor's art and unleashing on future generations thousands of hybrid semi-performances. Mr. Davis will, I hope, be supported by the public and by other distributors.

STANLEY KAUFFMANN

ART

The Silence of Flanders

Flemish painting of the 15th Century begins in a dream and ends in a nightmare. There doesn't seem to be much transition. Most of the great men of that great century painted dreams. In the works of Jan van Eyck, Roger van der Weyden, Petrus Christus, Dieric Bouts, Hans Memlinc and Hugo van der Goes, as in that of their contemporaries still identified only by the work – the Master of Flémalle, the Master of the Lucy Legend, the Master of the Saint Ursula Legend and others – individual qualities are more than sufficient to justify the bootstrap creation of identities for the latter and the agreed upon body of largely unsigned works of the former, yet there is also one common characteristic. Even more distinctive than the often minute realism shared by these painters is the air of entrancement that hovers over everything and every person in the world of their works. Typically, the Virgin sits in a neat interior, Child held on her lap, receiving the donor of the painting. The donor is usually accompanied by a patron saint or a guardian angel, but all the characters seem caught up in some kind of dream emanating from the deep meditation of the Virgin. The back of the box-like room opens on to

Flanders in the Fifteenth Century
The Detroit Institute of Arts

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

a balcony, where, perhaps, a man and girl, totally unrelated narratively to the scene within, lean upon a balustrade, backs to the viewer but manifestly held in the same trance as the main characters. Beyond the balustrade stretches a bit of harbor or a snatch of city, with recognizable roofs and steeples of churches still standing and the scenic background, too, is steeped in the atmosphere of dream.

If you take the profound introspection of the Virgin as the source or the goal of the Flemish dream, you can interpret the whole phenomenon as a direct expression of religious meditation. The dream atmosphere, however, casts its strange silence not only over Passions and particularly brutal martyrdoms, such as that of St. Hippolytus, who was torn apart by four horses attached to his arms and legs, as depicted by Bouts and van der Goes, but also over aristocratic portraits and over purely secular scenes, such as the Gerard David *Justice of Cambyses.*

Then, at the end of the century, with no particular warning, the dream became nightmare in the spectacular visions of Hieronymus Bosch. Yet the dream atmosphere of silence does persist throughout Bosch's schoolboy sadism and Fun-House infernos. The Boschian nightmare is attributed to such disparate causes as the painter's presumed membership in a sect of nudists and his employment as costume-maker and stage designer for carnivals in Flanders, but there isn't much speculation about the entranced silence of all these pictures.

The silence is present for questioning in the brilliant exhibition, *Flanders in the Fifteenth Century: Art and Civilization,* now at its only American showing, in the Detroit Institute of Arts. The show includes all the painters and paintings already mentioned, plus many more from American museums and Belgian museums, cities and churches. As the title implies, there's more to the exhibition than painting and that more probably carries higher value for the average American viewer even than the astonishing assemblage of Flemish masterpieces hitherto available, even in Flanders, only one or a few at a time. The show has tapestries, vestments, jewelry, reliquaries, domestic utensils, arms and armor, stained glass, town seals, navigational instruments and illuminated manuscripts. Above all, there is sculpture, in great profusion, chiefly of carved oak, but also of limestone and of metals, including gold and silver.

The magnificent run of paintings forms, no doubt, the heart of the show, but they maintain, appropriately, their silence about the stillness in Flemish paintings. The sculpture, indirectly, provides at least a guess. The guess is that that dream quality comes very largely from the medium, for there is no equivalent of it in the sculpture. The real wonder of the paintings is not the dream silence itself, but the combination of that quality with the closely observed realism with which all details are painted. In the sculpture the same realism is observed, but somehow there it combines with the pulse of active life. The trance is broken.

It's broken with ribald chuckles in four figures from choirstalls known as "Misericords," from their use as semi-seats for chanting monks as services grew interminable. It's broken in courtly pomp in a reliquary of gold and enamel showing Charles the Bold, kneeling with the relic, as he is presented by the similarly armored figure of St. George. It's broken in the very human grief of individual figures from Passion groups, silence forgotten in the crashing shock of the Crucifixion.

Figure after figure of the sculpture is extraordinary in conception and execution. There is a cast brass *Mary Magdalene,* about two feet high, from a paschal candelabrum - crucifix - lectern. The saint's face gazes upward in something like the lost reverie of the paintings; but her arms are thrown aloft in agony, her body slumps at the knees, her torso strains through the cloth and the drapery itself swirls downward in a flow of folds expressing the impact of the lance of sorrow.

There's a *Bad Thief,* carved of walnut,

NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

Richard Sparks *is an American on the staff of* The Economist *in London.* Knute Skinner *is in Paris writing a novel.* Herbert von Borch *is Washington correspondent of* Die Welt *of Hamburg and co-editor of the German foreign affairs quarterly* Aussen Politik.

An Offering
of Shares
[common stock
par value $10]
in
Portland
REPORTER
Publishing Co., Inc.
a New Liberal Newspaper
for Portland, Oregon
is being made by a
Prospectus
which may be obtained from the company at 901-A Corbett Building Portland 4, Oregon
●
Among the persons
who have already
purchased shares are
U. S. Senator
Wayne L. Morse
and
U. S. Senator
Maurine Neuberger

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

in which the angled limbs on the simple tau-cross and the chiseled facets of the flesh memorably unite the despair of the moment, the hard edge of carving and the gnarled piece of wood the carver must have started with.

There are polychromed angels that express the transfixing grief and the quality of becoming that you get from Giotto's angels at the Deposition. The polychrome in general is remarkable in every way. Most of it, including the gilt, is not contemporary with the carving, having been freshened up through the centuries; yet there is no feeling of addition to the carving. What we conventionally regard as two arts are completely one. There isn't a whisper of the garishness common to Latin American and even Spanish painted sculpture. There's perfect integration, as we accept that there was in Greece before time and weather gave a false classical clue to the Renaissance, one which, oddly enough, even the most anti-Renaissance sculptors have followed ever since.

A large part of the charm of Flanders in the 15th Century comes precisely from its position of great technical advance over the Middle Ages combined with independence of vision from the flowering Italian Renaissance. Nowhere does this appear more forcefully than in the colored sculpture at Detroit.

FRANK GETLEIN

EUROPE

We'll see the usual plus Russia, Scandinavia, Yugoslavia & N. Africa. A different trip—for the young in spirit who don't want to be herded around. Also shorter trips. Budget priced.

EUROPE SUMMER TOURS
255 Sequoia, Box N — Pasadena, California

ATHEISTS! AGNOSTICS! FREETHINKERS! THE SECULARIST is a fighting, informative monthly magazine for you. Annual subscription-membership: $3. American Secularist Ass'n, Dept. NR, Box 787, Newark 1, N. J.

"L'EXPRESS"
The leading liberal newspaper in France today.
Send 10¢ for your sample copy.
Howard Publications
Room 503
1475 Broadway
New York 36, N.Y.

"HAVE YOU OUTGROWN GODS, SAVIORS AND SUPERNATURALISM?
Is all your concern for people? Then welcome to the ranks of HUMANISTS. We cordially invite you to join the AMERICAN HUMANIST ASSOCIATION; we have local chapters, publications. Send $1 for three month special trial membership (or $5 for year) to:
AMERICAN HUMANIST ASSOCIATION
Dept. NR, Yellow Springs, Ohio

POLITICAL AND SOCIAL LIBERALS
will find challenge in this journal of liberal religious thought.
One year $2.50 — Send for complimentary copy.
THE CRANE REVIEW
Tufts University, Dept. C
Medford 55, Mass.

CLASSIFIED RATES

Per word (single insertion).....12c
Per word 6 times in one contract year.....11c
Per word 13 times in one contract year.....10c
Per word 26 times in one contract year..... 9c
Per word 48 times in one contract year..... 8c

NEW REPUBLIC
1244 Nineteenth St. N.W., Wash. 6, D.C.

Correspondence

The New Republic *welcomes communications in regard to subjects of current interest. Those of 300 words or less are most suitable for publication.*

Electors and the Electorate

Sirs:

In the election just past, California cast 197,000 votes for each of its 32 electoral votes, while Alaska cast only 18,000 popular votes for each of its 3 electoral votes. So far as electing a President is concerned, a Californian has less than one-tenth the voting power of an Eskimo. True the situation in California is a little unusual, but the ratio of popular votes to electoral votes in New York was 161,000 to one while in Mississippi it was 23,000 to one. The Mississippian has seven times the voting power of the New Yorker.

The thirteen states, New York, Pennsylvania, California, Illinois, Ohio, Michigan, Massachusetts, New Jersey, Indiana, Connecticut, Florida, Wisconsin, and Missouri cast two-thirds of the popular votes and a bare majority of the electoral votes. The other 37 states cast only one-third of the popular votes and lack but one of a majority in the Electoral College.

An amendment which would elect a President by direct popular vote would deprive the smaller states of this advantage and would seem to have no chance of passing the Senate. An amendment which would divide the electoral votes of the states in the ratio of the popular votes of the candidates in each state would preserve all of the inequalities of the present Electoral College system and would deprive the more populous states of the one advantage they now have, the influence which their large block of electoral votes has upon the nominating convention.

Richard L. Barrett
Las Cruces, New Mexico

I realize that it is not possible to discuss Gus Tyler's article ("Save the Electoral College," November 28) adequately in a letter of this kind, but the following, at least, should be pointed out. His argument against proportional voting is definitely unconvincing. He speaks of "one party" states. In the last election, there was no one party state. Even in Mississippi, there would have been, with proportional voting, a sufficient two party vote to require a division of the state's electoral vote. Proportional voting furnishes an incentive for voting, even in states hitherto called one party, whether they be in the North or in the South.

For one thing, the present system places too much power in minority groups. In the recent election, the Negro vote doubtless carried certain large states for Kennedy. Others, both North and South, were doubtless carried for Nixon by the Bible-Belt minds. There is nothing particularly democratic about this. Minority groups should have their voting rights, but it is hardly desirable to give them balance-of-power positions.

The present after-election controversy in the State of Illinois illustrates, forcibly, the grotesqueness of the present Electoral College system. In a vote of some four or five million, Kennedy received a plurality of less than 10,000 votes and, under the rules, gets all the state's 25 electoral votes. If a recount should transfer five thousand votes from his column to Nixon's, Nixon would take them all, and perhaps upset Kennedy's election. With proportional voting, the question would be whether Kennedy should receive 13 or only 12 of the state's votes. This would be a simpler and safer problem to handle than what we face now.

With proportional voting there would not be the tremendous temptation to pour money – with its attendant possibilities of fraud, corruption and chicanery – into a heavily populated state to

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

capture a majority of its popular vote. Instead there would be more legitimate campaigning in every state in the hope of getting for one's party an extra electoral vote or two. Furthermore, the proportional system would carry with it the very important feature that it would reduce to a minimum the likelihood of being threatened with the confusion of after-election demands for a recount.

Ed F. Alexander
Cincinnati, Ohio

In reply:

Mr. Alexander makes a good argument for direct popular election, but not for the "proportional plan" under which at least two of our Presidents with the greatest popular vote would have been defeated.

By "one party" states, I mean those where the dominant party habitually polls at least 60 percent of the popular vote. Evidence of their exaggerated power in this year's election under the proportional plan is contained on page 16 of my piece. In a "normal" election, their power would be even greater, as Senator Douglas proved copiously. (See his remarks in *Congressional Record*, March 26 and 29, 1956.)

By nullifying the influence of the large states, the proportional plan further exaggerates the power of that minority of the nation living in small-population states or in states with low voting participation. While Negro voters helped Kennedy in some states, they could not *carry* these states unless this "minority" voted with the *majority* in the state. Ditto for Bible Belt and Nixon.

As to recounts, the proportional plan – with its possibility for picking up electoral votes in virtually every state in the Union by the shift of several thousand ballots – would invite total retabulation in every state in a close year. The same applies to direct election.

Gus Tyler
New York, N.Y.

Overboard for Kennedy

Sirs:

Although admittedly partial to John Kennedy, I found the reporting by *The New Republic* in the election campaign to be considerably more colorful and honest than the bulk of the nation's press, which did little more than to echo the *ad hominem* appeals of Richard Nixon and equate the very name of Kennedy with inflation and socialism. *The New Republic* was at least willing to examine pertinent issues and evaluate the two presidential aspirants in relation to these issues.

The post-election issues of *The New Republic* have unfortunately yielded to an optimism which is more emotional than rational. TRB (whoever he may be) writes of "... our estimate of Kennedy. We have hardly dared to mention it, it is so high." And in Gerald Johnson's column, "The Superficial Aspect," we are given some pretty superficial reasons to back up the assertion, "He Will Be Great." Let's be honest: there are myth-makers in both parties; Peace and Prosperity on the right, New Frontiers on the left. And whereas these slogans would be hard-pressed to sell laxatives or dog-food, they are deemed comestible fodder for 180 million Americans. My question is this: why not wait a little? When the generalities of the Democratic platform have been resolved as specific legislative solutions to our many pressing problems, *then* your enthusiasm will be warranted and justified.

Thomas Lawson Clark
Clear, Alaska

The Punishment of Eichmann

Sirs:

Who is this Mr. Playfair who devotes several thousand words in a so-called book review, to torture our sensibilities in this veiled defense of Eichmann? (November 21).

I have devoted many years to the law, and I have long concluded, as have the many pleaders of the doctrine of "unwritten law" before me, that there can be created a condition which even the fine logic of the law cannot touch. ... The errant, occasional murderer may deserve your dilletantish debate as to the value of capital punishment. But the beast, ravaging the innocent by numbers which stagger belief or credence, cannot be debated. It offends civilized man to treat thus with him. The Jews have, in Eichmann, a symbol of their rightful quarry. Let them have him, and let them do with him what any man, worthy of the name, would do – and that, quickly.

Harold E. Friedman
Chicago, Illinois

Any Book

Out-of-print books located—no matter how old or long out-of-print. Name the book—we'll find it for you! (Title alone is sufficient.) All authors, subjects. Fiction, nonfiction. No obligation.

Books-On-File
Dept. NEW Union City, N.J.

RELIGION AND LABOR Council of America offers 3 issues of its weekly *Walking Together* free. Sprightly, informative, unique — 52 issues for $1! Write RLCA, 3498 No. High St., Columbus 24, Ohio

PERSONAL BOOKPLATES
Select designs – typefaces
Surprisingly inexpensive – Free brochure
NORMANDIE HOUSE 2610 W. 8th St. Los Angeles

BOOKS FOUND
THROUGH WORLD-WIDE CONTACTS
BOOK LAND
Box 74561K Los Angeles 4, Calif.

FOR ALL 1961 EUROPEAN CARS
WRITE
RAYMOND PETER PACH
American Sales
14 Via Sardegna
Rome, Italy
Cables: Amsales Rome
WE ARRANGE FOR PROMPT DELIVERY

EXPERIMENT WITH "SLEEP-LEARNING"
Self-hypnosis. Use your phonograph, recorder. Fascinating, educational. Details free.
Sleep-Learning Research Association
Box 24-NR Olympia, Washington

WE MOVE YOU WITHOUT TEARS
Economical, insured moving and storage vans, wagons—NYC, resorts, long distance
AL 5-8343
The Padded Wagon, Inc. New York, N. Y.

BRITISH SHOES FOR GENTLEMEN at a fraction of their American retail price! $10.95 includes duty and import charges. Delivery in ten days from receipt of order. Unconditional money back guarantee. Write for free illustrated catalogue. Steven Williams, Jr., Ltd., 40 Chatham Road, Short Hills, New Jersey.

MAKE YOUR WILL!
Simple. Two approved Will forms $2.00.
NATIONAL FORMS
Box 48313NR, Los Angeles 48, Calif.

EXPERIMENTAL COMMUNAL SOCIETY
To be founded in South Pacific. Seek 150 Members (21-40) Apply Box 25, The New Republic, 1244 19th Street, N.W., Washington 6, D. C.

BALL POINT PENS
15 for $1. Write Perfectly. Cash or Money Order.
ARTS UNLIMITED,
BOX 531 COOPER STATION, N.Y.C. 3.

Let us MAKE YOUR OPINIONS COUNT
Let us SEND THEM TO EVERY CONGRESSMAN
Let us do this fo 33 cents a month
ACOPOLL (NR) 430 S. Michigan, Chicago, Ill.

$70 WEEKLY — home, spare time. Simplified mail bookkeeping. Immediate income — easy! Auditax, 34757 DA, Los Angeles 34.

Printed by National Publishing Co., 301 N St., N.E., Washington 2, D. C.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED



. . . the most unusual operatic recording ever made

FLEDERMAUS GALA PERFORMANCE

Conducted by Herbert von Karajan

A brilliant cast from the Vienna State Opera

- Hilde Gueden
- Erika Köth
- Regina Resnik
- Erich Kunz
- Giusseppe Zampieri
- Waldemar Kmentt
- Walter Berry
- Eberhard Waechter

Surprise performances by such renowned artists as

- Renata Tebaldi
- Birgit Nilsson
- Giulietta Simionato
- Joan Sutherland
- Teresa Berganza
- Leontyne Price
- Mario Del Monaco
- Jussi Bjoerling
- Ettore Bastianini
- Fernando Corena

and

- Ljuba Welitsch

Write for free complete catalog

h.h. Scott — LONDON RECORDS

To take full advantage of the remarkable technical excellence of ffss records, we recommend the new London-Scott stereophonic Pickup and Arm.

ffrr mono | LONDON® RECORDS | ffss stereo

Dept. EE, 539 West 25th Street, New York 1, N. Y.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED